In Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v.Knupfer (In re PW, LLC),1 the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (the “BAP”) addressed the issue of whether a secured creditor had purchased estate property free and clear of liens, claims and encumbrances outside of a plan of reorganization.

In CDI Trust v. U.S. Electronics, Inc. (In re Communications Dynamics, Inc.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware addressed the issue of whether a rejection damages claim is subject to setoff against a pre-petition debt owed by the creditor to the debtor. The Court found that a rejection damages claim should be treated as if it arose pre-petition, and that the provisions of section 553 permitted, rather than prevented, the setoff of the rejection damages claim against the pre-petition debt.

Background

While derivations of intercreditor agreements continue to enhance the rights of the senior secured party, whether the many provisions provided for are enforceable in bankruptcy remains a burning question. Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia in In re Aerosol Packaging, LLC, 2006 WL 4030176 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 2006) helped bring clarity to one of the most important of these issues: is the right of a senior creditor to vote the claim of a junior creditor on whether to accept or reject a plan of reorganization enforceable in bankruptcy?

On July 24, 2013, Judge Steven W. Rhodes of the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan approved the City of Detroit’s motion to extend the automatic stay to various non-debtor parties, including certain state officials. The Court’s ruling effectively stays all pending litigation against the City, allows the City to continue to move forward with its chapter 9 case, and paves the way for a dispute over the City’s eligibility to file for chapter 9.

The Chapter 9 Filing and the State Court Litigation

Judge Martin Glenn of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently ruled that Borders gift card holders did not qualify as “known creditors.” The Court concluded that the gift card holders were entitled only to publication notice rather than actual notice of the bar date for filing bankruptcy claims in Borders’ chapter 11 case.

On November 23, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed Harrisburg, Pennsylvania’s Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition because, shortly before the filing, the state legislature expressly prohibited Harrisburg from seeking relief under Chapter 9.

On July 13, 2010, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit unanimously held that auto-parts supplier Visteon Corporation could not terminate health and life insurance benefits for approximately 2,100 retirees during its chapter 11 bankruptcy unless Visteon followed the specific requirements laid out in section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code, even if Visteon would have had the unilateral right to terminate these benefits outside bankruptcy.1 The Court found that a debtor may terminate any retiree benefits in bankruptcy only if,inter alia, the debt

On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.

Introduction

In Aalfs v. Wirum (In re Straightline Investments, Inc.),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether a post-petition factoring of accounts receivable by the debtor was an avoidable transfer under section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Bankruptcy Court, finding that the post-petition transfer had been properly avoided and that the lower court was justified in allowing the trustee both to recover the accounts receivable and their proceeds and to retain the consideration paid by the transferee.