The term “frenemy” – a combination of the words friend and enemy – has emerged from modern vernacular to describe someone who is simultaneously a partner and an adversary. The term is perhaps perfectly emblematic of the restructuring process where various constituents make and break alliances in an effort to steer the restructuring process. In so doing, the lines between friend and enemy are often blurred or altered during the course of the restructuring.

In the fourth quarter of 2008, global credit markets were virtually frozen, leading many distressed businesses and their constituents to take measures to avoid bankruptcy filings at almost all costs. Without access to debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing, bankruptcy most often results in liquidation – and with lenders reluctant to provide new money, even in exchange for superpriority and/or priming liens, total collapse became an increasingly common result.

A bankruptcy court wrote that filing for bankruptcy is “powerful magic.”  By finding federal preemption of state law fraudulent transfer claims, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in the long-running Tribune case showed just how powerful this magic can be.

What began as a garden variety bankruptcy claims objection has ended with a sharply-worded, sixty-page opinion, in which the Sixth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ( “BAP”) affirmed a bankruptcy court’s $200,000 sanctions order entered against the creditor’s attorney.

A popular line of thinking among bankruptcy practitioners and commentators holds that substantive consolidation – the combining of assets and liabilities of a debtor and another debtor or non-debtor entity to satisfy creditor claims against both entities ratably from the resulting pool – is an equitable remedy of judicial invention with no specific foundation in the Bankruptcy Code.

On May 31, 2009, approximately 30 days after Chrysler Group LLC and affiliated debtors filed for bankruptcy relief, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York authorized the sale of substantially all of Chrysler’s assets to “New Chrysler” – an entity formed by Chrysler and Fiat Automobiles SpA and initially majority-owned by Chrysler’s Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Association (VEBA) – free and clear of liens, claims and encumbrances under section 363 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the Fiat Transaction).

Many a bankruptcy attorney has been approached by an angry client who is owed a large amount from, or has obtained a judgment against another party, but has been frustrated in efforts to collect and wants to “throw them into bankruptcy.”  After trying to calm the client down, the attorney will go over the technical requirements for commencing an involuntary bankruptcy case and will undoubtedly carefully explain the financial risks that lie in wait in the event that the putative debtor opposes the bankruptcy and is successful in having it dismissed.  Specifically, section 303(j) of

Events are happening quickly these days with Caesars Entertainment.  On January 13, holders of second lien notes issued by Caesars Entertainment Operating Company (“CEOC”) filed an involuntary chapter 11 petition against CEOC in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.  Two days later, CEOC itself filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, setting up a venue fight over the bankruptcy case.  And later that same day, the U.S.

In a 113-page decision (click here to read decision) that is sure to be applauded by lenders and bond traders alike, Judge Alan S. Gold of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in overturning a Bankruptcy Court opinion that has caused lenders much concern, has issued a stern ruling that provides a bulwark against efforts by creditors and trustees in bankruptcy to expand the scope of the fraudulent conveyance provisions under the Bankruptcy Code.

During the bankruptcy cycle following the recession of 2001, numerous debtors – notably airlines such as US Airways and United Air Lines, Inc. – undertook “distress terminations” of their ERISA-qualified defined benefit pension plans, which are insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC found itself holding large general unsecured claims arising from significant underfunding of pension plans insured by the PBGC as a result of these terminations. Efforts by the PBGC to obtain either administrative priority or secured status for these claims invariably failed.1