Recently the Eleventh Circuit agreed to hear Jefferson County’s (“JeffCo”) petition for appeal of U.S. District Court Judge Sharon Blackburn’s ruling refusing to dismiss one of three appeals filed by JeffCo’s sewer system ratepayers.

The US Supreme Court has ruled in Stern v. Marshall (June 23, 2011) that a bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to render final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s compulsory counterclaim against a creditor arising under common law, despite a statutory grant of jurisdiction.

On December 1, 2009, numerous changes to the time periods applicable in bankruptcy cases took effect. These changes, which will impact creditors and debtors alike, are relatively straightforward but must be carefully reviewed and thoroughly understood. Time plays a critical role in the administration of bankruptcy cases, affecting the degree of notice a party is required to give before certain actions can be taken or approved by the bankruptcy court as well as deadlines for filing various documents, asserting various rights and satisfying certain statutory obligations.

As we previewed last week, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently handed General Motors (“New GM”) an enormous victory that may end up shielding the company from up to $10 billion in successor liability claims.

In what appears to be a matter of first impression, Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, has held that a statutory safe harbor against constructive fraudulent conveyance actions under the Bankruptcy Code involving securities transfers does not apply to the private sale of securities, even when there are no allegations of illegal conduct or fraud involved in the underlying transaction.

In a recent order entered in In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525, the Delaware bankruptcy court (1) clarified the application of Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(9) to creditors’ priority claims arising from the delivery of goods in the 20 days before a bankruptcy filing and (2) amended a previously entered procedures order to allow for the resolution of disputed “Twenty Day Claims” on their merits.

On August 4, 2017, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued its ruling in Varela v. AE Liquidation, Inc. (In re AE Liquidation, Inc.), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14359 (3d Cir.

The bankruptcy courts have a long history of being willing to use their judicial power under the Bankruptcy Code to prevent perceived efforts by debtors to inappropriately shield their assets from creditors. This is true even when the debtors employ structures and devices that are complex and crafted in seeming compliance with applicable law.

Last week this author delved into what has become known as the “Texas Two-Step,” the arguments for and against its permissibility and the broader implications for the bankruptcy system.

Do a lessee’s possessory interests in real property survive a “free and clear” sale of the property under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code? In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said “no,” holding that section 365(h) did not protect the interest of the lessee in the context of a section 363 sale when there had been no prior formal rejection of the lease under section 365.