In Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of America v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s long-standing Fobian rule disallowing claims against a bankruptcy estate for attorney’s fees arising from litigating issues that are “peculiar to federal bankruptcy law,” rather than basic contract enforcement. In so ruling, the Court recognized the presumption that “claims enforceable under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are expressly disallowed.”

"In Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015), a divided U.S. Supreme Court resolved the circuit split regarding whether a bankruptcy court may, with the consent of the litigants, adjudicate a claim that, though statutorily denominated as “core,” is not otherwise constitutionally determinable by a bankruptcy judge. The majority held that so long as consent—whether express or implied—is “knowing and voluntary,” Article III of the U.S. Constitution is not violated by a bankruptcy court’s adjudication of such a claim.

In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made headlines when it ruled that creditors' state law fraudulent transfer claims arising from the 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") of Tribune Co. ("Tribune") were preempted by the safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. In that ruling, In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 946 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 209 L. Ed. 2d 568 (U.S. Apr.

The Situation: In Homaidan v. Sallie Mae, Inc., et al., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently affirmed that certain types of private student loans are not "obligation[s] to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend" that are exempt from discharge in bankruptcy absent an undue hardship.

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to avoid fraudulent transfers is an important tool promoting the bankruptcy policies of equality of distribution among creditors and maximizing the property included in the estate.

In Short

The Situation: On August 11, 2020, a Credit Derivatives Determinations Committee for EMEA ("DC") unanimously determined that the Chapter 15 filing by British retailer Matalan triggered a Bankruptcy Credit Event under standard credit default swaps ("CDS").

The Result: The DC's decision diverged from its only prior decision (involving Thomas Cook) on whether a Chapter 15 petition constituted a Bankruptcy Credit Event.

Under the "single-satisfaction rule," although a bankruptcy trustee or a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") may seek to avoid and recover avoidable transfers of a debtor's property from more than one transferee, the aggregate recovery is limited to the value of the property transferred. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit examined this rule in Jones v. Brand Law Firm PA (In re Belmonte), 931 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2019).

In Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 652, 2019 WL 2166392 (U.S. May 20, 2019), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the rejection in bankruptcy of a trademark license agreement, which constitutes a breach of the agreement under section 365(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, does not terminate the rights of the licensee that would survive the licensor’s breach under applicable non-bankruptcy law.

In Kaye v. Blue Bell Creameries, Inc. (In re BFW Liquidation, LLC), 899 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit broadened the scope of section 547(c)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code’s "subsequent new value" defense against preference actions by holding that the provision applies to all new value supplied by the creditor during the preference period and not merely to new value that remains unpaid on the bankruptcy petition date.

In U.S. Capital Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 2018 WL 1143822, No. 15-1509 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an appellate court should apply a deferential standard of review to a bankruptcy court’s decision as to whether a creditor is a "nonstatutory" insider of the debtor for the purpose of determining whether the creditor’s vote in favor of a nonconsensual chapter 11 plan can be counted.