In Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Quantum Foods, LLC v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (In re Quantum Foods, LLC), 554 B.R. 729 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016), a Delaware bankruptcy court held in a matter of apparent first impression that a creditor’s allowed administrative expense claim may be set off against the creditor’s potential liability for a preferential transfer. The ruling is an important development for prepetition vendors that continue to provide goods or services to a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession.
Secured lenders have welcomed a ruling recently handed down by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the chapter 11 cases of Aéropostale, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, "Aéropostale"). In In re Aéropostale, Inc., 2016 BL 279439 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2016), Bankruptcy Judge Sean H.
One of the prerequisites to confirmation of any chapter 11 plan is that at least one “impaired” class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. This requirement reflects the basic (but not universally accepted) principle that a plan may not be imposed on a dissident body of stakeholders of which no class has given approval. However, it is sometimes an invitation to creative machinations designed to muster the requisite votes for confirmation of the plan.
In 1994, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to, among other things, add section 1123(d), which provides that, if a chapter 11 plan proposes to “cure” a default under a contract, the cure amount must be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law. Since then, a majority of courts have held that such a cure amount must include any default-rate interest required under either the contract or applicable nonbankruptcy law. A ruling recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit endorses this view.
In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.
BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING REVIEW VOL. 21 • NO. 4 JULY–AUGUST 2022 1 IN THIS ISSUE 1 U.S.
It is well recognized that, in keeping with the "fresh start" or "rehabilitative" policy, the Bankruptcy Code invalidates after-acquired property clauses in prepetition security agreements, but also includes an exception to the general rule for prepetition liens on the proceeds, products, offspring, or profits of prepetition collateral. Less well understood is that there is an "exception to the exception" if a bankruptcy court determines that the "equities of the case" suggest that property acquired by the estate should be free of such liens.
It is generally recognized that a bankruptcy court has the power—either equitable or statutory—to recharacterize a purported debt as equity if the substance of the transaction belies the labels the parties have given it. A ruling handed down by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York provides a textbook example of such a recharacterization. In In re Live Primary, LLC, 2021 WL 772248 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar.
In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made headlines when it ruled that creditors' state law fraudulent transfer claims arising from the 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") of Tribune Co. ("Tribune") were preempted by the safe harbor for certain securities, commodity or forward contract payments set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 946 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 20-8-07102020, 2020 WL 3891501 (U.S.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently handed down three rulings potentially impacting bankruptcy cases.
Nunc Pro TuncRelief
In Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano, No. 18-921, 2020 WL 871715 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2020), the Court circumscribed the use of nunc pro tunc ("now for then") orders that make relief ordered by a court apply retroactively to an earlier point in time.