A basic tenet of bankruptcy law, premised on the legal separateness of a debtor prior to filing for bankruptcy and the estate created upon a bankruptcy filing, is that prepetition debts are generally treated differently than debts incurred by the estate, which are generally treated as priority administrative expenses. However, this seemingly straightforward principle is sometimes difficult to apply in cases where a debt technically "arose" or "was incurred" prepetition, but does not become payable until sometime during the bankruptcy case.

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to sell assets of the bankruptcy estate "free and clear" of "any interest" in the property asserted by a non-debtor is an important tool designed to maximize the value of the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California recently examined whether such interests include "successor liability" claims that might otherwise be asserted against the purchaser of a debtor's assets. In In re Catalina Sea Ranch, LLC, 2020 WL 1900308 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.

In Short

The Situation. In Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether bankruptcy court orders conclusively denying relief from the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay are immediately appealable.

The Result. On January 14, 2020, the Court unanimously ruled that an order conclusively resolving a motion for relief from the automatic stay was immediately appealable, such that a later-filed appeal was untimely and must be dismissed.

The recent chapter 11 filings by PG&E Corp. and its Pacific Gas & Electric Co. utility subsidiary (collectively, "PG&E") and FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. have reignited the debate over the power of a U.S. bankruptcy court to authorize the rejection of contracts regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). Only a handful of courts have addressed this thorny issue to date, and with conflicting results in a controversy that may ultimately need to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court or legislative action.

On September 21, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware affirmed a bankruptcy court's ruling that it had the constitutional authority to grant nonconsensual third-party releases in an order confirming the chapter 11 plan of laboratory testing company Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC ("Millennium"). SeeOpt-Out Lenders v. Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC (In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC), 2018 WL 4521941 (D. Del. Sept. 21, 2018).

In U.S. Capital Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, No. 15-1509 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an appellate court should apply a deferential standard of review to a bankruptcy court's decision as to whether a creditor is a "nonstatutory" insider. Nonstatutory insiders are creditors who are not specifically designated as insiders under the Bankruptcy Code (such as officers, directors, and controlling shareholders), but who the bankruptcy court determines nonetheless have sufficient influence over a debtor to be deemed insiders.

The next few years are expected to see a significant increase in the volume of bankruptcy cases filed by health care providers. Thus far in 2017, the number of bankruptcies in health care-related sectors, including hospitals, physicians’ offices and clinics, specialty outpatient facilities, assisted-living facilities, and other providers, has been surpassed only by bankruptcies in the oil and gas, finance, and retail industries.

Among the required elements of a claim to avoid a preferential transfer under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is that, if the creditor-transferee were permitted to retain a pre-bankruptcy payment, it would end up being paid more than it would receive in a hypothetical liquidation of the debtor under chapter 7, assuming the transfer did not occur. This requirement and a defense to preference liability predicated on it—the "Kiwi defense"—were the subject of a ruling handed down by a Delaware bankruptcy court. In Pirinate Consulting Grp., LLC v. C. R. Meyer & Sons Co.

The U.S. Supreme Court issued two rulings in 2016 involving issues of bankruptcy law.

Section 350(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy court under certain circumstances to reopen a bankruptcy case even after the estate has been fully administered and the case is closed. In In re Atari, 2016 BL 125936 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2016), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York explored the circumstances under which it may be appropriate to reopen a closed chapter 11 case.