On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, that a Bankruptcy Judge lacked constitutional authority to issue a final ruling on state law counterclaims by a debtor against a claimant. This is the latest round of a well-known case involving the estate of former model Anna Nicole Smith and the estate of her late husband, wealthy oil magnate J. Howard Marshall.  

This is the first in a series of four articles on why Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9031, titled “Masters Not Authorized,” needs to be amended to authorize the utilization of special masters in complex bankruptcy cases.

The focus of this first article is on how special masters are already utilized, effectively, by federal district courts under Fed.R.Civ.P. 53 (titled, “Masters”).[Fn. 1]

Special Masters in Federal Courts

–A Brief History

In contrast to a case under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which centralizes a company’s debt adjustment efforts in the U.S. and provides for expansive oversight and supervision by a U.S. court, a Chapter 15 recognition proceeding is an ancillary proceeding in which the U.S. court acknowledges the foreign proceeding and gives it effect under applicable U.S. law.

The US Supreme Court has ruled in Stern v. Marshall (June 23, 2011) that a bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to render final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s compulsory counterclaim against a creditor arising under common law, despite a statutory grant of jurisdiction.

Putting it mildly, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling last year in Stern v. Marshall, 132 S. Ct. 56 (2011), cast a wrench into the day-to-day operation of U.S. bankruptcy courts scrambling to deal with a deluge of challenges—strategic or otherwise—to the scope of their “core” jurisdiction to issue final orders and judgments on a wide range of disputes. In Stern, the Court ruled that, to the extent that 28 U.S.C.

U.S. federal courts have frequently been referred to as the “guardians of the Constitution.” Under Article III of the Constitution, federal judges are appointed for life by the U.S. president with the approval of the Senate. They can be removed from office only through impeachment and conviction by Congress. The first bill considered by the U.S. Senate—the Judiciary Act of 1789—divided the U.S. into what eventually became 12 judicial “circuits.” In addition, the court system is divided geographically into 94 “districts” throughout the U.S.

As expected the Harrisburg City Council has filed a reply to the numerous objections to the Chapter 9 filing of Harrisburg initiated by the City Council.  The City Council’s brief (harrisburg response.pdf) appears to be the only timely filed reply to the objections to the Chapter 9 filing. 

In a decision that may have significant practical implications to the practice of bankruptcy law, the U.S. Supreme Court recently declared, on constitutional grounds, that a bankruptcy court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a debtor’s state law counterclaims, thus considerably limiting the ability of the bankruptcy court to fully and finally adjudicate claims in a bankruptcy case. Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179 (June 23, 2011).

The district court in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, et al. v. American Capital Equipment, et al., No. 06-0891 (U.S. Dist. Ct. W.D. Pa. May 11, 2007), affirmed that Skinner Engine Company's insurers have standing to move to dismiss Skinner's chapter 11 bankruptcy case and to challenge its bankruptcy plan. However, the court also affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of the insurers' motion to dismiss the bankruptcy case.

In Millenium Lab Holdings, Delaware District Court Judge Leonard Stark, on an appeal from a bankruptcy court order confirming a plan of reorganization, recently upheld a challenge to the bankruptcy court’s constitutional authority to release claims against non-debtor third parties under the plan.