On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision in the Stern v.

In a decision that may have significant practical implications to the practice of bankruptcy law, the U.S. Supreme Court recently declared, on constitutional grounds, that a bankruptcy court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a debtor’s state law counterclaims, thus considerably limiting the ability of the bankruptcy court to fully and finally adjudicate claims in a bankruptcy case. Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179 (June 23, 2011).

On June 9, 2014, a unanimous Supreme Court issued the latest in a series of key rulings regarding the extent of a bankruptcy court’s constitutional authority.¹ Notably, while Monday’s Executive Benefitsdecision answered one important question arising out of the Court’s 2011 decision in Stern v. Marshall,² it also left the primary question that resulted in a split in the Circuit Courts of Appeals to be decided another day.

The Aftermath of Stern v. Marshall

In a departure from other bankruptcy courts in the Third Circuit and her own recent prior opinion, U.S. Bankruptcy Chief Judge Mary France of the Middle District of Pennsylvania broadly interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 2 (2011), and held that a bankruptcy court lacks the constitutional authority to issue a final judgment in any fraudulent transfer action where the defendant (i) has not filed a proof of claim and (ii) has not consented to the bankruptcy judge entering a final judgment on the matter. 

Probably the most significant bankruptcy law development in the past several years has been the narrowing of bankruptcy courts’ constitutional authority to enter final judgments.  See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct.

Adding to the split of authority that has developed since the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011), in Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 12-1349 (Aug. 21, 2013), the 7th Circuit aligned with the 6th Circuit’s decision in Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910 (6th Cir. 2012), to hold that a party may not consent or waive objection to the limited Constitutional authority of an Article I bankruptcy court.

Lest you thought you had heard the end of the Stern v. Marshall debate, two recent circuit court decisions remind us that Stern is alive and influential. In October, the Sixth Circuit weighed in on a bankruptcy court’s constitutional authority where it discharged certain fraudulent debts and awarded damages. In early December, the Ninth Circuit performed a similar constitutional analysis where the bankruptcy court decided a fraudulent transfer action against a noncreditor of the bankruptcy estate.

Becoming the first Court of Appeals to address an issue that has divided the bankruptcy and district courts, the Ninth Circuit adopted a forceful view of Stern v. Marshall,1 to hold in In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.2 that absent the parties’ consent, the limitations imposed by Article III of the Constitution deprive a bankruptcy judge of the constitutional authority to enter judgment on fraudulent transfer claims brought against parties who have not filed proofs of claim.

The Ninth Circuit recently held that: (1) bankruptcy courts lack the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on all fraudulent transfer claims against non-claimants, whether brought under state or federal law, and (2) a defendant can waive such an argument by not asserting the applicability of Stern v. Marshall¹ at the trial level.² Further, in dicta, the court noted that bankruptcy courts may issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in matters in which the bankruptcy court cannot issue final orders.

In a surprising decision certain to reinvigorate the ongoing debate about the scope of Stern v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a broad view of Stern and held that the structural nature of the limitations imposed on bankruptcy courts by Article III of the Constitution could not be waived by a party’s failure to object at the trial court level. The decision, Waldman v. Stone, 2012 WL 5275241 (6th Cir. Oct.