GII Industries, Inc. v. New York Dep’t of Transp. 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3663 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011)
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York considered the appropriate method for calculating a contractor’s inefficiency damages and whether the contractor was entitled to prejudgment interest in connection with a highway reconstruction project. The Court held that the total cost method was the appropriate manner by which to calculate damages and that the contractor was entitled to prejudgment interest running from the date final payment was due.
Back in the mists of time, a seller that had a valid reclamation claim but was denied the return of its goods was entitled to an administrative expense claim (a claim with a higher priority than a general unsecured claim and thus a better chance of getting paid) or a lien on the debtor’s assets. The 2005 amendment to § 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code changed all that by stripping away those alternative remedies.
The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in Stern v. Marshall1 that a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to render a final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s counterclaim against a creditor based on state common law, despite an express statutory grant of jurisdiction. This ruling is the most significant decision regarding bankruptcy court jurisdiction since the Court’s 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline v. Marathon2 and it could significantly affect the administration of bankruptcy cases.
Root of the Constitutional Problem
In a recent decision arising out of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Global Industrial Technologies, Inc. (GIT),1 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, held that insurance companies that had issued liability insurance policies to a manufacturer before its bankruptcy filing had standing to object to confirmation of the company’s Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, even though the plan had been designed to be “insurance neutral” with regard to the policies.
The macroeconomic impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) on nearly all industries is forcing businesses directly and indirectly affected by the global pandemic to consider restructuring alternatives. Since prospective businesses looking to reorganize or liquidate through the chapter 11 process are likely to need immediate cash in order to operate their businesses, these companies often will look to existing or third-party lenders (and in certain cases, stalking horse bidders or customer groups) to provide them with debtor-in-possession financing (DIP Financing).
Reprinted with permission from the May 6, 2011 issue of The Legal Intelligencer © 2010 ALM Media Properties, LLC. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. All rights reserved.
Over the last 12 months there has been a substantial increase in the number of preference recovery actions filed. The irony created by the current economic environment is that many such defendants are themselves financially distressed and unable to fully satisfy any judgment that might be rendered against them.
As solar industry observers will already know, on April 21st, 2016, (the “Filing Date”) SunEdison, Inc. (“SunEdison”) and several of its U.S. and international subsidiaries (the "SunEdison Group") filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Chapter 11 Proceedings”)in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “ US Bankruptcy Court”).1
On March 23, 2017, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Court”) issued an opinion in the chapter 15 case of Banco Cruzeiro do Sul, S.A., a Brazilian bank (“BCSUL” or the “Debtor”), holding, among other things, that section 1521(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code does not prevent foreign representatives from commencing state law fraudulent conveyance actions. See Laspro Consultores LTDA v. Alinia Corp. (In re Massa Falida Do Banco Cruzeiro Do Sul S.A.), No. 14-22974-BKC-LMI, Adv. Pro. No. 16-01315-LMI, 2017 WL 1102814 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.