In a decision of first impression entered on June 3, 2020, a Chicago bankruptcy court (“Court”) held that a restaurant tenant was excused from paying a significant portion of its rent under the force majeure provisions of its lease because of the governor’s executive order prohibiting in-house dining during the COVID-19 pandemic.[1] This decision is highly significant for landlords and tenants whose ability to service their clients has similarly been restricted by government orders.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently held that a Cayman Islands collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) could be a debtor under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) and declined to dismiss an involuntary case commenced against the CDO by certain noteholders on the grounds that the notes held by such noteholders were “non-recourse” notes. Below is a discussion of the court’s decision and its potential implications. The decision is currently being appealed.

Lender repossesses the equipment of its business borrower after it defaults on its secured loan agreement. Because borrower needs the equipment to run its business, it then files a Chapter 11 petition and promptly asks lender to return the equipment. Lender refuses because the equipment secures the defaulted loan. Depending on where the debtor sought bankruptcy relief (e.g., New York or New Jersey), lender may be subject to sanctions for holding on to the equipment. 

On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a "cramdown" plan. In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).2 The Seventh Circuit's decision creates a split with recent decisions in the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a lender's ability to credit bid its secured debt. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.

A bankruptcy trustee may sell “avoidance powers to a self-interested party that will abandon those claims, so long as the overall value obtained for the transfer is appropriate,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Jan. 15, 2020. Silverman v. Birdsell, 2020 WL 236777, *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 2020).

The U.S. Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision on June 28, 2011, held that Bankruptcy Code § 546(e), which exempts a “Settlement Payment” from a bankruptcy trustee’s avoiding powers, insulated two sellers of Enron Corporation’s commercial paper from suit despite Enron’s early pre- bankruptcy redemption. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., ___F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2536101 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011) (2-1).

“[A] secured creditor [has no] affirmative obligation under the automatic stay to return a debtor’s [repossessed] collateral to the bankruptcy estate immediately upon notice of the debtor’s bankruptcy,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held on Oct. 28, 2019. In re Denby-Peterson, 2019 WL 5538570, 1 (3d Cir. Oct. 28, 2019). Affirming the lower courts, the Third Circuit joined “the minority of our sister courts — the Tenth and D.C. Circuits” with its holding.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Feb. 10, 2010, that a corporate debtor’s pre-bankruptcy severance payments to its former chief executive officer (“CEO”) were fraudulent transfers. In re Transtexas Gas Corp., ____ F.3d _____, 2010 BL 28145 (5th Cir. 2/10/10). Because of its holding “that the payments were fraudulent under the Bankruptcy Code,” the court did “not consider other possible violations, including [the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] or [Bankruptcy Code] Section 547(b) [preferences].” Id. at *5.

An insolvent parent’s college “tuition payments… depleted the [debtor’s] estate and furnished nothing of direct value to the [debtor’s] creditors…,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on Nov. 12, 2019. In re Palladino, 2019 WL 5883721, *3 (1st Cir. Nov. 12, 2019). Reversing the bankruptcy court on a direct appeal, the First Circuit rejected its reasoning “that a financially self-sufficient daughter offered [the debtor parents] an economic benefit.” Id. at *2.

On Jan. 25, 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that a trust deed provision reversing a priority of payment waterfall upon the bankruptcy of a credit support provider under a swap agreement is unenforceable under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).