Creditors of a Chapter 11 debtor asserting “state law, constructive fraudulent [transfer] claims … are preempted by Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e),” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on March 29, 2016. In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, 2016 WL ____, at *1 (2d Cir. March 29, 2016), as corrected.
The Fourth Circuit, on June 15, 2007, affirmed the dismissal of a Chapter 11 reorganization petition filed by a tenant debtor in a commercial lease dispute. Maryland Port Administration v. Premier Automotive Services, Incorporated (In re Premier Automotive Services, Incorporated), ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 1721951 (4th Cir. 6/15/07).
On Aug.
A district court judgment dismissing a $500 million fraudulent transfer and breach of fiduciary duty suit against Campbell Soup Co., the former parent of Vlasic Foods International (“VFI” or “the debtor”), was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, on March 30, 2007. VFB, LLC v. Campbell Soup Co., 2007 WL 942360 (3d Cir. 3/30/07).
U.S. District Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York, applying the swap agreement safe harbor provision of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") §546(g), dismissed a Chapter 11 litigation trustee's state law fraudulent transfer complaint against a bank on June 11, 2013. Whyte v. Barclays Bank, PLC, 2013 WL2489925 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013).
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the "District Court") on March 29, 2012 held that a bankruptcy court sale order issued under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code ("Section 363") could not extinguish state law successor liability personal injury claims brought against the purchaser by third parties injured after the close of the bankruptcy case, but whose injuries arose out of conduct of the debtor prior to its bankruptcy. Morgan Olson LLC v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Industries, Inc.), 2012 WL 1038672 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
In a decision of first impression entered on June 3, 2020, a Chicago bankruptcy court (“Court”) held that a restaurant tenant was excused from paying a significant portion of its rent under the force majeure provisions of its lease because of the governor’s executive order prohibiting in-house dining during the COVID-19 pandemic.[1] This decision is highly significant for landlords and tenants whose ability to service their clients has similarly been restricted by government orders.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently held that a Cayman Islands collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) could be a debtor under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) and declined to dismiss an involuntary case commenced against the CDO by certain noteholders on the grounds that the notes held by such noteholders were “non-recourse” notes. Below is a discussion of the court’s decision and its potential implications. The decision is currently being appealed.
Lender repossesses the equipment of its business borrower after it defaults on its secured loan agreement. Because borrower needs the equipment to run its business, it then files a Chapter 11 petition and promptly asks lender to return the equipment. Lender refuses because the equipment secures the defaulted loan. Depending on where the debtor sought bankruptcy relief (e.g., New York or New Jersey), lender may be subject to sanctions for holding on to the equipment.
On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a "cramdown" plan. In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).2 The Seventh Circuit's decision creates a split with recent decisions in the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a lender's ability to credit bid its secured debt. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.