In its first bankruptcy decision of 2014 (October Term, 2013), the U.S. Supreme Court held on March 4, 2014, in Law v. Siegel, No. 12-5196 (Mar. 4, 2014) (available athttp://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-5196_8mjp.pdf), that a bankruptcy court cannot impose a surcharge on exempt property due to a chapter 7 debtor's misconduct, acknowledging that the Supreme Court's decision may create "inequitable results" for trustees and creditors.

When the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512 (3d Cir. 2008), in September 2008, it was the most significant accounting malpractice decision of last year and perhaps the most significant damages case in the last 20 years. Why? Accounting malpractice cases are filled with pitfalls for unsuspecting plaintiffs. Moreover, accounting firms tend to settle cases in which the plaintiffs survive motions predicated on tried-and-true legal defenses and factual hurdles. The result is that few auditing malpractice cases are tried.

The ability to "surcharge" a secured creditor's collateral in bankruptcy is an important resource available to a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession ("DIP"), particularly in cases where there is little or no equity in the estate to pay administrative costs, such as the fees and expenses of estate-retained professionals. However, as demonstrated by a ruling handed down by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the circumstances under which collateral may be surcharged are narrow. In In re Towne, Inc., 2013 BL 232068 (3d Cir. Aug.

The importance and practical benefits resulting from the use of the same in-house counsel for an entire corporate family are numerous. For example, the in-house attorneys are particularly familiar with the corporate family’s structure, can assist with joint public filings, and can expertly oversee the corporate family’s compliance with regulatory regimes. If a subsidiary in the corporate family becomes financially distressed, however, the creditors of the financially distressed entity may look to the parent corporation for recourse.

Recent Developments

The strategic importance of classifying claims and interests under a chapter 11 plan is sometimes an invitation for creative machinations designed to muster adequate support for confirmation of the plan. Although the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally states that only “substantially similar” claims or interests can be classified together, it neither defines “substantial similarity” nor requires that all claims or interests fitting the description be classified together.

A ruling handed down by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on November 15, 2013, adds yet another chapter to the ongoing controversy concerning whether sold or assigned claims can be subject to disallowance under section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code on the basis of the seller’s receipt of a voidable transfer. The decision—In re KB Toys Inc., 2013 WL 6038248 (3d Cir. Nov. 15, 2013)—is an unwelcome missive for claims traders. For the first time since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, a circuit court of appeals has concluded that:

On March 15, 2007, with Jones Day’s assistance as bankruptcy counsel, FLYi, Inc. (“FLYi”), Independence Air, Inc. (“Independence”) and their affiliated debtors (collectively, the “Debtors”) obtained confirmation of their chapter 11 plan under the “cramdown” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The plan, which become effective on March 30, 2007, will distribute approximately $150 million to unsecured creditors. In ruling on confirmation of the plan, the U.S.

Before soliciting votes on its bankruptcy plan, a chapter 11 debtor that has filed for bankruptcy typically must obtain court approval of its disclosure statement. As part of the disclosure-statement approval process, interested parties are afforded the opportunity to object. For example, a party may object on the grounds that the disclosure statement lacks sufficient information about the debtor. Sometimes, however, a party objects to the disclosure statement because the chapter 11 plan described by the statement cannot be confirmed.

In 1984, the Third Circuit was the first court of appeals to examine the Bankruptcy Code’s new definition of “claim” in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984). Focusing on the “right to payment” language in that definition, the court decided that a claim arises when a claimant’s right to payment accrues under applicable nonbankruptcy law. This “accrual” test was widely criticized by other circuit courts as contradicting the broad definition of “claim” envisioned by Congress and the Bankruptcy Code.