The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored by Judge Thomas Ambro, has reversed two district court opinions and refused to allow a company to use a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing as a means to reduce interest on its debt obligations. Specifically, the court held that filing for bankruptcy would not excuse a debtor from its obligation for a “make-whole” payment otherwise due to its lenders.

A majority of today’s large Chapter 11 cases are structured as quick Section 363 sales of all the debtor’s assets followed by confirmation of a plan of liquidation, dismissal of the case, or a conversion to a Chapter 7. The purchaser in the sale is often one of the debtor’s prepetition secured or undersecured lenders, which may also act as the debtor-inpossession (DIP) lender and purchase the debtor’s assets through a credit bid, with no cash consideration.

In post-confirmation proceedings, bankruptcy courts maintain the ability to clarify a plan where silent or ambiguous, and interpret a plan to advance equitable considerations.  However, bankruptcy courts are not allowed to modify a plan outside the confines of section

Because we couldn’t possibly top Judge Fisher’s opening line, we’re borrowing it for our introduction of In re Daniel W.

The extent of a transferee’s knowledge in the context of fraudulent transfer claims under the Bankruptcy Code has been a frequent topic of discussion on the Weil Bankruptcy Blog.

Earlier this week, the Third Circuit affirmed a federal bankruptcy court’s dismissal of a mesothelioma claim against a bankrupt oil company that arose as an adversary proceeding fifteen years after the bankruptcy plan was confirmed and discharged all outstanding claims.  The Circuit held that because the parties conceded the claim arose at the time of the victim’s asbestos exposure, which pre-dated the defendant’s bankruptcy, a

The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.

In a victory for secured creditors, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held inRiver Road Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC), 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011), that a dissenting class of secured lenders cannot be deprived of the right to credit-bid its claims under a chapter 11 plan that proposes an auction sale of the lenders’ collateral free and clear of liens.

In a case of first impression, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in In re American Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 637 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2011), held that, for purposes of section 562 of the Bankruptcy Code, a discounted cash flow analysis was a “commercially reasonable determinant” of value for the liquidation of mortgage loans in a repurchase transaction.  

Although it has been described as an “extraordinary remedy,” the ability of a bankruptcy court to order the substantive consolidation of related debtor-entities in bankruptcy (if circumstances so dictate) is relatively uncontroversial, as an appropriate exercise of a bankruptcy court’s broad (albeit nonstatutory) equitable powers. By contrast, considerable controversy surrounds the far less common practice of ordering consolidation of a debtor in bankruptcy with a nondebtor.