Whether a contract is "executory" such that it can be assumed, rejected, or assigned in bankruptcy is a question infrequently addressed by the circuit courts of appeals. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit provided some rare appellate court-level guidance on the question in Matter of Falcon V, L.L.C., 44 F.4th 348 (5th Cir. 2022). The Fifth Circuit affirmed lower-court rulings determining that a surety contract was not executory because the surety had already posted irrevocable surety bonds and did not owe further performance to the debtors.

The Third Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to disqualify the plaintiff’s law firm in a large adversary proceeding, holding that it had not abused its discretion because the plaintiff law firm (W) had “complied with” American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10(a)(2). In re Maxus Energy Corp., 2022 WL 4113656, *4 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2022). According to the court, a lawyer (B) who “moved from” the defendant’s law firm “to the [plaintiff’s] firm” was not cause for W (the new firm) to be disqualified.

On September 19, 2022, a panel of three appellate judges for the 3rd Circuit heard oral argument in a closely-watched case, In re LTL Management LLC, Case No. 22-2003.

On November 4, 2010, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois certified the appeal of debtors River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, et al. of the court’s Order Denying Debtors’ Bid Procedures Motion (the Order) entered October 5, 2010. In its Order, the bankruptcy court expressly denied the debtors’ attempts to prevent their secured creditors from credit bidding in a proposed sale of assets under a chapter 11 plan.

A popular line of thinking among bankruptcy practitioners and commentators holds that substantive consolidation – the combining of assets and liabilities of a debtor and another debtor or non-debtor entity to satisfy creditor claims against both entities ratably from the resulting pool – is an equitable remedy of judicial invention with no specific foundation in the Bankruptcy Code.

Introduction

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dealt a blow to secured creditors in its recent decision holding that a debtor may prohibit a lender from credit bidding on its collateral in connection with a sale of assets under a plan of reorganization. In the case of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-4266 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 2010), the court, in a 2-1 decision, determined that a plan that provides secured lenders with the “indubitable equivalent” of their secured interest in an asset is not required to permit credit bidding when that asset is sold.

In 1999 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rendered its decision in Calpine Corp. v. O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc. (In re O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc.), 181 F.2d 527, denying Calpine Corporation’s request for the payment of a break-up fee after Calpine lost its effort to acquire the assets of O’Brien Environmental Energy out of bankruptcy.

The October 15, 2009 decision of the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Pillowtex opens the door for creditors in the Third Circuit to increase their "new value" preference defense under the "subsequent advance" approach.In re Pillowtex, No. 03-12339 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Oct. 15, 2009).

A trustee’s power to avoid preference payments is circumscribed by the statutory defenses set forth in section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. The "subsequent new value" defense set forth in section 547(c)(4) has three well-established elements:

On May 4, 2016, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a bankruptcy settlement in the form of a tender offer did not violate the principles of the bankruptcy process. See opinion here.