On April 27, 2009, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on two of three questions presented for review from the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Schwab v. Reilly. Below, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, which held that when the values on a debtor’s list of assets and on her claim of exemptions are equal, a Chapter 7 Trustee must object to a debtor’s claim of exempt property within 30 days in order to retain his statutory authority to later sell property for the benefit of creditors.

A recent opinion from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confirms that “actual control” over a debtor is not necessary to qualify as a nonstatutory “insider” for the purpose of extending the period for preference recovery under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. See Schubert v. Lucent Technologies, Inc. (In re Winstar Communications, Inc.), 554 F.3d 382 (3rd Cir. 2009).

After a relatively brief and checkered stint in Delaware courts, it appears that the cause of action against corporate directors for “deepening insolvency” may have lost its place in Delaware corporate jurisprudence.

Oil and gas producers in Texas and a handful of other states have had the comfort of believing that they held purchase money security interests against the production in the hands of first purchasers and proceeds of that production. Now, the law supporting that belief has come under fire.

As is now well known, General Motors, Inc. and Chrysler LLC financially restructured themselves with the help of the United States Treasury. These restructurings occurred very quickly – Chrysler and GM each filed for bankruptcy and sold substantially all of their automobile-producing assets to newly created companies2 within approximately forty days. Each company used the bankruptcy process to massively deleverage and free itself from personal injury liability claims.

On August 28, 2009, Delta Financial Corp. (“Delta”) filed a Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit seeking to overturn the dismissal of its coverage action against Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Co. (“Westchester”) and United States Fire Insurance Co. (“USFI”). The coverage action, which was filed as a part of an adversary proceeding with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, sought coverage under two D&O policies issued by Westchester and USFI respectively.

In an area of the law that continues to be active, the federal bankruptcy court in Delaware has once again issued a detailed ruling on the actions of directors and officers leading up to a company's insolvency. Among the notable conclusions are: (1) failure to conduct due diligence before obtaining a loan may support a claim for breach of duty of care; and (2) there is no cause of action for "improvident lending" in Delaware or New Jersey. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Fedders N. Am., Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Credit Partners L.P. (In re Fedders N. Am., Inc.), 405 B.R.

The October 15, 2009 decision of the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Pillowtex opens the door for creditors in the Third Circuit to increase their "new value" preference defense under the "subsequent advance" approach.In re Pillowtex, No. 03-12339 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Oct. 15, 2009).

A trustee’s power to avoid preference payments is circumscribed by the statutory defenses set forth in section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. The "subsequent new value" defense set forth in section 547(c)(4) has three well-established elements:

United States Supreme Court

Washington, D.C.

November 3, 2009

On November 12th, the Third Circuit affirmed both bankruptcy and district court findings that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a claim seeking rescission of a mortgage filed in an adversarial action in federal bankruptcy court after a state court entered a default foreclosure order on that mortgage. The Third Circuit held further that the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff on her Truth in Lending Act claim was proper.