On June 2, 2010, the Third Circuit overruled longstanding precedent interpreting the definition of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. In JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), No. 09-1563, slip op., (3d Cir. June 2, 2010) an en banc panel rejected the state law accrual theory of claims recognition established in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (Matter of M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), in favor of the more widely followed conduct test theory.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, applying New York law, has held that an inadequate consideration exclusion unambiguously bars coverage for a lawsuit arising out of a debt restructuring transaction. Delta Financial Corp. v. Westchester Surplus Ins. Co. (In re Delta Financial Corp.), 2010 WL 1784054 (3d Cir. May 5, 2010).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on June 2, 2010, sitting en banc, overruled its own precedential holding in Avellino & Beines v. M. Frenville Co. (Frenville), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), to hold that in the context of asbestos-related tort claims, a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a product giving rise to an injury rather than when the injury manifests itself. JED-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s), No. 1563, slip op. at 18 (3d Cir. June 2, 2010).

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York recently addressed an objection to the debtor-in-possession financing approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the bankruptcy of General Growth Properties.1 The District Court’s decision, which holds that reversal on appeal of an order approving DIP financing does not invalidate the financing or liens granted by the postpetition lenders, if provided in good faith also addresses both the timeliness of the appeal and the merits of the arguments raised therein, provides a detai

Introduction

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the District Court’s ruling in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC.1 The Court allowed Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC to require all-cash bids for the asset sale under their proposed plan. This precluded secured creditors from credit bidding, as long as the plan provided those creditors with the “indubitable equivalent” of the value of their claims.

In Schwab v. Reilly, the United States Supreme Court recently reversed a decision from the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the need for a bankruptcy trustee to lodge an objection to an exemption where the property is actually worth more than the amount claimed by the exemption. The Supreme Court took the opportunity in this case to also clarify its prior ruling in Taylor v.

Merger and acquisition transactions frequently have included ongoing obligations of the parties to each other. In a recent decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, a trademark licensee in a 1991 acquisition survived an effort by the bankrupt licensor to overturn the license. (In re: Exide Technologies, U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 08-1872 filed June 2, 2010) The case illustrates that the time in which agreements in a merger and acquisition transaction remain at issue can be longer than would be expected.  

Reversing both the bankruptcy court and the district court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a trademark licensing agreement had been substantially performed and was therefore not subject to rejection under §365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. In re Exide Technologies, Case No. 08-1872 (3d Cir., June 1, 2010) (Roth, J.) (Ambro, J., concurring).

Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code is intended to allow financially stressed debtors to restructure their debt obligations through a plan of reorganization. Typically, a Chapter 11 plan places different types of claims in different classes and, subject to various requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, allows the debtor to pay only portions of the claims (and in certain circumstances not to pay certain claims at all). Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor the flexibility to structure a plan to defer the payment of certain claims.