The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on Dec. 6, 2010, summarily affirmed a bankruptcy court’s designation of a secured lender’s vote on a reorganization plan in a two-page order, effectively enabling the debtor to cram down the lender’s claim. In re DBSD North America, Inc., __ F.3d__, 2010 WL 4925878 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2010).1 As a result, the lender who bought all of the debtor’s senior first-lien secured debt at par will be paid only interest over a period of four years before its loan matures. SeeIn re DBSD North America, Inc., 419 B.R. 179, 207-08 (Bankr.
Introduction
In St. Hill v. Tribeca Lending Corp., Case No. 09-2214, 2010 WL 2997724 (3rd Cir. Dec. 8, 2010), the Third Circuit showed that, in determining whether the Truth In Lending Act (TILA) applied to a credit transaction, it would look beyond obvious facts to ascertain a transaction's "primary purpose."
In In re Rodriguez, No. 09-2724 (3rd Cir. Dec 23, 2010), a three-judge panel for the Third Circuit considered whether an automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code prevented a mortgage servicer from accounting for a pre-petition shortage on a mortgage escrow account in its post-petition calculation of the bankrupt debtors’ future monthly escrow payments. The majority held that the bankruptcy stay did prohibit such conduct by the loan servicer.
The United States Bankruptcy Code prohibits an employer from taking adverse action against an existing employee because of a bankruptcy filing.
On December 23rd, the Third Circuit addressed whether the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code prevents a home mortgage lender from accounting for the pre-petition escrow shortage in its post-petition calculation of future monthly escrow payments. The Court concluded that when the terms of the loan allow the lender to escrow taxes and insurance payments, the lender has a pre-petition claim. In re Francisco Rodriguez.
Introduction
A debtor's decision to assume or reject an executory contract is typically given deferential treatment by bankruptcy courts under a "business judgment" standard. Certain types of nondebtor parties to such contracts, however, have been afforded special protections. For example, in 1988, Congress added section 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code, granting some intellectual property licensees the right to continued use of licensed property, notwithstanding a debtor's rejection of the underlying license agreement.
Earlier this month, in Rea v. Federated Investors, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25501 (Dec. 15, 2010), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that while federal law prohibits a private employer from firing or discriminating against an employee who files or has filed for bankruptcy, it does not prohibit a private employer from denying employment to someone simply because he had filed for bankruptcy in the past. Thus, 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) does not create a cause of action against private employers who engage in discriminatory hiring.
Rea v. Federated Investors, 2010 WL 5094250 (3d Cir., December 15, 2010) – The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that a provision in the Bankruptcy Code which prohibits private employers from “terminat[ing] the employment of, or discriminat[ing] with respect to employment” against an individual who had previously declared bankruptcy, doesnot create a cause of action against a private employer who declines to hire based upon an applicant’s previously declared bankruptcy. Analyzing the bankruptcy provision at issue, 11 U.S.C.