The U.S. Supreme Court has handed down two rulings thus far in 2016 (October 2015 Term) involving issues of bankruptcy law. In the first, Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 194 L. Ed. 2d 655, 2016 BL 154812 (2016), the Court addressed the scope of section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, which bars the discharge of any debt of an individual debtor for money, property, services, or credit to the extent obtained by "false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition."
When an adversary proceeding is transferred to the district court pursuant to a withdrawal of the reference, which rules—and deadlines—apply: those contained within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or those contained within the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure? The Eleventh Circuit recently held the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, govern adversary proceedings before the district courts. Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, LLC, 2016 WL 1392642 (11th Cir. 2016).
On June 28, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge to a Third Circuit-affirmed settlement and dismissal of the chapter 11 cases of Jevic Transportation, Inc. (“Jevic”) and certain of its affiliates. SeeOfficial Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. grantedCzyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 2016 WL 3496769 (U.S. 2016).
The Eleventh Circuit has made it clear: it will not back down from its decision in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, a decision it issued in 2014 and one which has been the subject of hot debate ever since. In Crawford, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the filing of a proof of claim was an attempt to collect a debt and the filing of a proof of claim on time-barred debt violated the FDCPA. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014). Since Crawford, the debate has raged on with several courts weighing in on the subject.
The question of what constitutes “equal treatment” is a question as old as law itself. Though a favored topic by the Aristotles and the Rousseaus of the world, the question is not entirely esoteric. The concept plays a central role in the law of bankruptcy – courts occasionally describe the principle of equitable distribution between similarly situated creditors as one of the “pillars” of the Bankruptcy Code.
The power of a debtor or trustee to avoid preferential transfers that benefit certain creditors over others is critical to achieving one of the primary tenets of the Bankruptcy Code – the equality of treatment among all creditors. This ability to recover preferences prevents a debtor from favoring certain creditors over others by transferring property in the time leading up to a bankruptcy filing. Although these preference powers are broad, they are restrained by certain conditions, including a minimum threshold on amounts that can be avoided.
On May 4, 2016, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a bankruptcy settlement in the form of a tender offer did not violate the principles of the bankruptcy process. See opinion here.
TGIF, right?! Before kick starting your weekend — here’s what you need to know about the recent decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the chapter 11 cases of SemCrude L.P. and its debtor affiliates.
FACTS
A divided panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling in In re: Philadelphia Newspapers, et. al. (3d. Cir., Case No. 09-4266) and held that secured creditors do not have a statutory right to credit bid their debt at a sale conducted under a plan of reorganization pursuant to which the debtor elects to provide the secured creditors with the "indubitable equivalent" of their secured claim.
This week, in a 2-1 decision affirming the District Court’s reversal of a ruling of the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that secured creditors do not have a right as a matter of law to credit bid their claim at an auction pursuant to a plan of reorganization where the debtor intends to impose the plan on its secured creditors through a “cramdown” under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code; i.e., a plan providing the secured creditors with the “indubitable equivalent” of their secured claim.