In a recent opinion, JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2010), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit overruled its prior decision in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), which adopted the accrual test, a standard for determining the existence of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code.

On February 7, 2011, in In re DBSD North America, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit released its opinion joining the Third Circuit in condemning socalled “gifting plans,” thus deepening the perceived circuit split with the First Circuit which has been interpreted as approving of gifting plans. In so doing, the Second Circuit relied on the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship2 and Norwest Bank Worthington v.

So what do railroad barons, second lien lenders and satellites have in common? Strangely, the derailment of the gifting doctrine for cram-down plans, at least, in the Second Circuit. In an Opinion filed on February 7, 2011, the Second Circuit issued what amounted to a teaser for bankruptcy professionals. It started with a decision by Bankruptcy Judge Gerber of the Southern District of New York to confirm a Chapter 11 plan that included a “gift” from the second lien lenders to equity, even though unsecured creditors were not being paid in full.

The Bankruptcy Code sets forth the relative priority of claims against a debtor and the waterfall in which such claims are typically paid. In order for a court to confirm a plan over a dissenting class of creditors – what is commonly called a “cram-down” – the Bankruptcy Code demands thateither (i) the dissenting class receives the full value of its claim, or (ii) no classes junior to that class receive any property under the plan on account of their junior claims or interests. This is known as the “absolute priority rule.”

In Rea v. Federal Investors (10-1440), the Third Circuit held that no private cause of action exists against a private employer that refused to hire an applicant because the applicant previously filed for bankruptcy. The appellant applied to an investment firm and, after an interview, the firm was seemingly poised to hire him. The investment firm, however, denied him employment because it discovered he filed bankruptcy seven years earlier. The appellant filed suit, claiming the firm violated federal law by discriminating against him on account of his prior bankruptcy.

The Supreme Court’s 2010-2011 term began in October, and it is expected to conclude by the end of April. We have been monitoring the decisions of our nation’s highest court and you may have already read some of the summaries of the major decisions written by Larkin Hoffman attorneys. This update provides a brief look at some of the cases that have been scheduled for oral argument since our last update in November.

On February 16th, the Third Circuit addressed an issue of first impression and held that the discounted cash flow method was the proper measure of damages under Bankruptcy Code Section 562 when a market price cannot be determined. The parties had entered into a $1.2 billion repurchase agreement for a portfolio of home mortgages. On the day the debtor defaulted, the distressed state of the credit markets made it commercially unreasonable for the purchaser to sell the portfolio and the market price would not reflect the asset's worth.

The United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals (the "Third Circuit") issued an opinion on February 16, 2011 in the American Home Mortgage chapter 11 proceeding that upheld a determination by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Court") on the valuation of a creditor’s claim that in connection with the termination and acceleration of a mortgage loan repurchase agreement.1 The decision is significant because the Third Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision that the post-acceleration market value of the mortgage loans was not a relevant m

On February 16, 2011, the Third Circuit affirmed a Delaware bankruptcy court's order determining the value of mortgage loans in the context of a 2006 repurchase agreement. Buyer Calyon argued that the mortgage loan portfolio sold to it by American Home Mortgage had a market price of only $670 million, as compared to its $1.15 billion contractual repurchase price, and that American Home Mortgage was required to pay Calyon the $480 million difference under a repo agreement.

The Federal Bankruptcy Act prohibits public and private employers from engaging in various discriminatory acts against individuals because they have filed for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 525. Inexplicably, the statutes applicable to public and private employers are not identical. The law applicable to a public employer, for example, specifically provides that it "may not . . . deny employment to" one who has filed for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a). This "deny employment to" language does not appear in the statute for private employers. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b).