Bankruptcy Code § 365(d)(3) requires the trustee or the debtor in possession to "timely perform all the obligations of the debtor . . .arising from and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 503(b)(1)." In 2001 the Third Circuit construed this section to require the debtor to perform the lease in accordance with its terms. CenterPoint Properties v. Montgomery Ward Holding Corp. (In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp.), 268 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001).

Commercial lessors have long enjoyed certain individualized protections under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Third Circuit’s recent decision in In re Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc., __ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 2671929 (3d Cir. June 29, 2010), makes it clear that commercial lessors also can take advantage of the more general protections available to creditors to obtain payment for goods and services they provide to a debtor after it files for bankruptcy where the specific protections are not applicable.

Section 365(d)(3)

Bankruptcy lawyers who are regularly involved in distressed m&a deals have been wondering for the past few months about the potential fallout from Philadelphia Newspapers.

In the W.R. Grace bankruptcy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reaffirmed its prior rulings on the controversial issue of a bankruptcy court’s power to enjoin actions by third parties against non-debtors.1 Resting on prior precedent, the Third Circuit held that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin third party actions that have no direct effect upon the bankruptcy estate.

The concurring opinion in a recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals case1 suggests that trademark licensees may be able to retain their rights in bankruptcy cases, even if licensors reject the license agreements. The majority did not consider whether the licensee could retain its rights. Instead, the majority held that the trademark license was not an executory contract; therefore, it could not be rejected under the Bankruptcy Code. The majority opinion applies narrowly to circumstances involving perpetual, exclusive, and royalty-free trademark licenses.

In September of this year, the Honorable Mary F. Walrath, the presiding Judge in the DHP Holdings bankruptcy, issued a decision addressing the effect of a forum selection clause when deciding a motion to change venue. This issue came before the court in an adversary action filed by DHP against The Home Depot. After DHP filed for bankruptcy, the company sued Home Depot for $5.5 million alleging Home Depot owed the company for an outstanding account receivable.

Introduction: Earlier this year, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC[1] sent shockwaves through the secured lending community. In a 2-1 decision, the court held that a debtor can confirm a plan of reorganization while denying the secured creditor the opportunity to credit bid for its collateral if the plan provides the lender with the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim.

In the well-publicized opinion of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC et al., 599 F. 3d 298 (3rd Cir. 2010), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,1 held that Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)2 is unambiguous and is to be read in the disjunctive, thus allowing a proponent of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization to use the "cram down" power under subsection (iii) of that Section without allowing a secured creditor to credit bid on a sale proposed as part of the plan.

Introduction

On September 14, 2010, a New York state court entered an Order of Rehabilitation for Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company and Centennial Insurance Company (collectively, "Atlantic") to try to resolve Atlantic's insolvency and return it to the marketplace. The court appointed the New York Superintendent of Insurance as the "Rehabilitator" and directed the Rehabilitator to, among other things, take possession and control of Atlantic's property, conduct Atlantic 's business, and remove the causes and conditions that made this rehabilitation proceeding necessary.