The current liquidity drought is pushing more businesses toward some form of financial reorganization. As the restructurings become more frequent, two different trends–one in bankruptcy and the other in private equity–will intersect. The result may surprise dealmakers searching the detritus for investment opportunities.

The “deepening insolvency” doctrine received another blow1 when a federal bankruptcy judge dismissed claims against the former directors and shareholders of a corporation for allegedly covering up massive fraud perpetuated by the business.

Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that claims for “damages arising from the purchase or sale of . . . a security” of the debtor or an affiliate of the debtor are subordinated to any claims not based on stock. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b). Because there is rarely enough value in a bankrupt company to satisfy all claims, a determination that a particular claim is subject to mandatory subordination under section 510(b) means that, as a practical matter, the claim is unlikely to receive any distribution from the estate.

A recent decision by the Delaware bankruptcy court highlights the issues which must be considered by private equity firms, investment funds and other entities who play an active role in the management of their financially distressed portfolio companies.

Boards of directors of troubled companies must balance their fiduciary obligations to shareholders and creditors. Insolvent companies owe duties to creditors and not solely to shareholders and, under evolving case law, companies acting in the "zone of insolvency" owe a duty to creditors as well as to shareholders.

AlphaStar Insurance Group Ltd. ("AlphaStar") (f/k/a Stirling Cooke Brown Holdings Ltd) was a group of companies which provided, among other services, reinsurance brokerage and intermediary services through companies in London, Bermuda and the United States. The companies collapsed and eventually declared bankruptcy, largely as a result of their involvement in the personal accident reinsurance market. Richard E.

The rapid growth in derivatives as hedging instruments, particularly through equity swaps, credit default swaps ("CDS") and loan credit default swaps ("LCDS"), has challenged fundamental assumptions underlying corporate governance law, federal shareholder disclosure requirements and bankruptcy law. Corporate law has long relied on a "one share one vote" model, which presumes that a shareholder's economic interests in a corporation are inextricably linked to their voting power.

In Mukamal v. Bakes,1 the trustee of two trusts created under a chapter 11 plan of reorganization filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) against the former directors and officers of the debtors, the dominant shareholders of the debtors and the debtors’ accounting firm, alleging, among other things, various breaches of fiduciary duties.

In a recent case,1 the Fifth Circuit emphasized its rule that a creditor's claim may be equitably subordinated to the claims of other creditors only to the extent necessary to offset the harm that the other creditors have suffered, based on specific findings and conclusions.

Background

For the third time in as many years, the Delaware Chancery Court has handed down an important ruling interpreting the interaction between federal bankruptcy law and Delaware corporate law. The thorny question this time was whether a bankruptcy court’s determination that the directors of a corporation acted in good faith when they authorized a chapter 11 filing precluded a subsequent claim that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by doing so. The Delaware Chancery Court concluded that it did, ruling in Nelson v.