Directors and officers of Delaware corporations face no liability to corporate creditors from direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty, under the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent ruling in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, (May 18, 2007) (“North American Catholic”).

“Give ups” by senior classes of creditors to achieve confirmation of a plan have become an increasingly common feature of the chapter 11 process, as stakeholders strive to avoid disputes that can prolong the bankruptcy case and drain estate assets by driving up administrative costs.

In North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, addressed the ability of creditors to assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty against directors of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent or operating within the zone of insolvency.

On May 18, 2007, in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla (“Gheewalla”),1 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision2 in which the Court of Chancery precluded creditors from filing direct suits for breach of fiduciary duty against directors of corporations that are either in the zone of insolvency or are actually insolvent. With its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court has limited creditors’ ability to sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty.

In two related actions, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that the proceeds of a D&O policy are not property of the debtor's estate and refused to grant an injunction requested by a trustee to prevent the directors and officers from consummating a settlement that would exhaust the policy limits.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado, applying Colorado law, has denied an insurer's motion for summary judgment and granted in part motions for partial summary judgment by the policyholder's former CEO and a bankruptcy trustee as assignee of the policyholder's former directors. Genesis Ins. Co. v. Crowley, 2007 WL 1832039 (D. Colo. June 25, 2007).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held on July 26, 2007, that a bankruptcy court properly calculated an investment bank's advisory fee under a reasonableness standard. In re Citation Corp., ___ F.3d ___ 2007 WL 2128165 (July 26, 2007).

The strategic importance of classifying claims and interests under a chapter 11 plan is sometimes an invitation for creative machinations designed to muster adequate support for confirmation of the plan. Although the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally states that only “substantially similar” claims or interests can be classified together, it neither defines “substantial similarity” nor requires that all claims or interests fitting the description be classified together.

Though the shareholders of a corporation did not sign a corporate sale agreement, they were considered to be the sellers of the corporation, and therefore were entitled to avail themselves of the indemnification provisions under the agreement, ruled the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See In re NuNet, Inc., 348 B.R. 300 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006).

In a significant Delaware law decision regarding creditors’ ability to sue corporate fiduciaries, the Delaware Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of whether a corporate director owes fiduciary duties to the creditors of a company that is insolvent or in the “zone of insolvency.” In North American Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, the court concluded that directors of a solvent Delaware corporation that is operating in the zone of insolvency owe their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders, and not creditors.