On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.
Introduction
The High Court1 in England has confirmed the validity under English law of contractual provisions common in structured finance transactions which subordinate payments to a swap counterparty in circumstances where the swap counterparty has defaulted on its obligations under the terms of the relevant swap agreement.
The Judgment
Parties
Metropolitan Insurance Company has joined ING Clarion Capital Loan Services, Inc., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and FRM Funding Company, Inc in requesting the Bankruptcy Court to dismiss as bad faith filings the bankruptcy cases of twenty-one property level CMBS borrower subsidiaries of General Growth Properties, Inc. ING filed the first motion on May 4th with respect to eight debtors, and a hearing was set for May 27th. That hearing was subsequently adjourned to June 17th. Creditors having similar motions to be heard on June 17th were required to file their motions to dismiss by May 29th .
A lender’s entitlement to a make-whole premium, that is, a prepayment penalty designed to compensate the lender for the loss of interest payments it would have received had the borrower continued to service the debt through the maturity date of the loan, depends principally on the plain language of the bond indenture or credit agreement. See, e.g.,HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Calpine Corp. (In re Calpine Corp.),No. 07 Civ 3088 (GBD), 2010 WL 3835200, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
On Dec. 21, 2011, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey approved a liquidation plan for collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) Zais Investment Grade Limited VII (“ZING VII”). The plan incorporates a settlement between senior noteholders who had initiated the bankruptcy case by filing an involuntary petition against the CDO, and junior noteholders who were appealing the Bankruptcy Court’s April 26, 2011 order granting the involuntary petition.
On Jan. 25, 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that a trust deed provision reversing a priority of payment waterfall upon the bankruptcy of a credit support provider under a swap agreement is unenforceable under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).
In a decision to be hailed by buyers of distressed debt and bankruptcy claims on the secondary loan market, on Oct. 15, 2009, the New York Court of Appeals (the “Court”), in a fact-specific ruling, held that an assignment of claim does not violate New York’s champerty statute (forbidding trading in litigation claims) if the purpose of the assignment is to collect damages by means of a lawsuit for losses on a debt instrument in which the assignee holds a pre-existing proprietary interest. Trust for the Certificate Holders of the Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc.
On August 4, 2016, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court considered cross-motions for summary judgment in a preference action case styled as Pirinate Consulting Group, LLC v. Maryland Department of the Environment (In re NewPage Corp.), Adv. Pro. No. 13-52206 (KG). This gem of an opinion is noteworthy in that it analyzes various defenses raised by a state agency to a preference complaint.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a noteworthy opinion for those whose work involves real estate mortgage conduit trusts (REMIC trusts) or utilization of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions. In In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC,1 Bankruptcy Judge Jacqueline P.
Recent court decisions in the state of Michigan—Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Cherryland Mall, ____ N.W.2d _____, 2011 WL 6785393 (Mich.App. 2011) (Cherryland) in the Michigan intermediate appellate court and 51382 Gratiot Avenue Holdings Inc. v. Chesterfield Development Company, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142404 (E.D. Mi. Dec.