Congress enacted amendments to the United States Bankruptcy Code in 2005 designed to increase certainty in the marketplace for mortgage loan repurchase agreements and other financial contracts.1 The contours – and limits – of these amendments were recently explored by the Delaware bankruptcy court in Calyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp.
A lender’s entitlement to a make-whole premium, that is, a prepayment penalty designed to compensate the lender for the loss of interest payments it would have received had the borrower continued to service the debt through the maturity date of the loan, depends principally on the plain language of the bond indenture or credit agreement. See, e.g.,HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Calpine Corp. (In re Calpine Corp.),No. 07 Civ 3088 (GBD), 2010 WL 3835200, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
On Dec. 21, 2011, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey approved a liquidation plan for collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) Zais Investment Grade Limited VII (“ZING VII”). The plan incorporates a settlement between senior noteholders who had initiated the bankruptcy case by filing an involuntary petition against the CDO, and junior noteholders who were appealing the Bankruptcy Court’s April 26, 2011 order granting the involuntary petition.
On Jan. 25, 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that a trust deed provision reversing a priority of payment waterfall upon the bankruptcy of a credit support provider under a swap agreement is unenforceable under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).
In a decision to be hailed by buyers of distressed debt and bankruptcy claims on the secondary loan market, on Oct. 15, 2009, the New York Court of Appeals (the “Court”), in a fact-specific ruling, held that an assignment of claim does not violate New York’s champerty statute (forbidding trading in litigation claims) if the purpose of the assignment is to collect damages by means of a lawsuit for losses on a debt instrument in which the assignee holds a pre-existing proprietary interest. Trust for the Certificate Holders of the Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc.
On August 4, 2016, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court considered cross-motions for summary judgment in a preference action case styled as Pirinate Consulting Group, LLC v. Maryland Department of the Environment (In re NewPage Corp.), Adv. Pro. No. 13-52206 (KG). This gem of an opinion is noteworthy in that it analyzes various defenses raised by a state agency to a preference complaint.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a noteworthy opinion for those whose work involves real estate mortgage conduit trusts (REMIC trusts) or utilization of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions. In In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC,1 Bankruptcy Judge Jacqueline P.
Recent court decisions in the state of Michigan—Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Cherryland Mall, ____ N.W.2d _____, 2011 WL 6785393 (Mich.App. 2011) (Cherryland) in the Michigan intermediate appellate court and 51382 Gratiot Avenue Holdings Inc. v. Chesterfield Development Company, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142404 (E.D. Mi. Dec.
Today, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) announced the close of a Rule 144A sale of $1.8 billion principal amount of notes backed by 103 non-agency residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) from seven failed bank receiverships.
On August 11, 2009, in a long-anticipated ruling in the Chapter 11 case of General Growth Properties, Inc. (GGP), the court denied the motions to dismiss that had been brought on behalf of several of the property-level lenders.1 Few, if any, observers expected that the court would grant these motions and actually dismiss any of the individual SPE borrowers from the larger GGP bankruptcy, as doing so would have likely opened the door for the other secured lenders to seek dismissal.