In our update of October 20, 2008, we reported on whether "negative equity" can be part of a purchase money security interest. (http://www.masudafunai.com/showarticle.aspx?Show=3093) "Negative equity" is the excess of the amount owed on a trade-in item over the market value of the item.
A fundamental component in the commercial mortgage-backed securities ("CMBS") market is the lender's reliance that the loan is made to a "bankruptcy remote" special purpose entity ("SPE"). The loan documents and operating agreements relating to an SPE typically require that the SPE maintain separate existence and contain restrictions that limit the SPE's debt and ensure separateness.
In a decision to be hailed by buyers of distressed debt and bankruptcy claims on the secondary loan market, on Oct. 15, 2009, the New York Court of Appeals (the “Court”), in a fact-specific ruling, held that an assignment of claim does not violate New York’s champerty statute (forbidding trading in litigation claims) if the purpose of the assignment is to collect damages by means of a lawsuit for losses on a debt instrument in which the assignee holds a pre-existing proprietary interest. Trust for the Certificate Holders of the Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc.
Not necessarily so, according to the recent rulings of Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper in the US$27 billion General Growth Properties Chapter 11 bankruptcy—at least with respect to the issue of substantive consolidation.
On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.
On Jan. 25, 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that a trust deed provision reversing a priority of payment waterfall upon the bankruptcy of a credit support provider under a swap agreement is unenforceable under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).
During the past 18 months, the world has felt the impact of derivatives on financial markets. Many businesses have for years used derivative contracts such as currency or interest rate swaps or forward contracts for the purchase of oil, gold, natural gas, wheat or other commodities to hedge their exposure to an unexpected rise or fall in values, interest rates or prices. However, the scope and extent of trading in derivative instruments exploded during the past 10 years, causing profound effects on the world’s financial markets.
In a significant ruling with potentially wide-reaching implications, Judge Lewis Kaplan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the Securities Act of 1933 causes of action (Sections 11, 12, and 15) against McGraw Hill and Moody's (the "Rating Agencies") in In re: Lehman Brother Mortgage Backed Securities Litigation.
On January 25, Judge Peck of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York entered a declaratory judgment in favor of Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (LBSF) in a case examining a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction and concerning the effect of event of default provisions on the payment priorities of LBSF as swap counterparty under certain swap agreements and the holders of certain credit-linked synthetic portfolio notes. The payment waterfalls (Priority Provisions) of most CDO transactions give priority to swap counterparties over noteholders.
Today, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) announced the close of a Rule 144A sale of $1.8 billion principal amount of notes backed by 103 non-agency residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) from seven failed bank receiverships.