On July 26, 2016, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Bankruptcy Code section 546(e) "safe harbor" applicable to constructive fraudulent transfers that are settlement payments made in connection with securities contracts does not protect "transfers that are simply conducted through financial institutions (or the other entities named in section 546(e)), where the entity is neither the debtor nor the transferee but only the conduit."FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 2016 BL 243677.

Madoff

A contractual waiver of an entity’s right to file for bankruptcy is generally invalid as a matter of public policy. Nonetheless, lenders sometimes attempt to prevent a borrower from seeking bankruptcy protection by conditioning financing on a covenant, bylaw, or corporate charter provision that restricts the power of the borrower’s governing body to authorize such a filing. One such restriction—a lender-designated “special member” with the power to block a bankruptcy filing—was recently invalidated by the court in In re Lake Mich.

On April 19, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal of a landmark 2019 decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding the applicability of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments to prevent the avoidance in bankruptcy of $8.3 billion in payments made to the shareholders of Tribune Co. as part of its 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO").

Recent Developments

The United States Second Circuit has issued its ruling in the Momentive Performance Materials casesresolving three separate appeals by different groups of creditors of Judge Bricetti’s judgment in the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York, which affirmed

In a highly-anticipated decision on a long-running bondholder dispute, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its judgment last week in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v Education Management Corp. It concluded that “Section 316(b) [of the US Trust Indenture Act 1939] prohibits only non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms”, i.e. the amount of principal and interest owed and the maturity date.

The Second Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp., holding that “Section 316(b) prohibits only non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms.” At issue is whether the phrase “right . . . to receive payment” forecloses “more than formal amendments to payment terms that eliminate the right to sue for payment.” The Second Circuit held that it does not.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp. on May 12, 2016. One might have thought from the courtroom’s overflow crowd that it was the opening argument in a mob trial, but this is a case about a bond indenture. At issue is whether an out-of-court debt restructuring that did not amend the indenture’s principal and interest terms, but that effectively precluded the noteholders’ ability to be repaid, violated § 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (TIA).

In a unanimous decision arising out of the Tribune Media Company bankruptcy cases, a panel of the Second Circuit held that the safe harbor under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which precludes avoidance of certain transfers by a