The District Court for the Southern District of New York recently issued an opinion in Picard v. Katz, et al., (In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC),1 which limits avoidance actions against a debtor-broker’s customers to those arising under federal law based on actual, rather than constructive, fraud. The decision was issued by US District Judge Rakoff in the Trustee’s suit against the owners of the New York Mets (along with certain of their friends, family and associates).

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that redemptions of commercial paper made through the Depositary Trust Company (DTC) are entitled to the “safe harbor” protections afforded to settlement payments under Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e), and are, therefore, not preferential transfers, even though such payments were made prior to maturity.1 The Second Circuit is the first Circuit Court of Appeal to address the issue, which arises out of the Enron bankruptcy case.

Legal Framework

On February 7, 2011, in a highly anticipated decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that in Chapter 11 reorganizations, senior creditors may not “gift” recoveries to junior creditors and/or equity interest holders over the objection of an intervening class. In In re DBSD N.A., Inc., __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 350480 (2d Cir. 2011), the majority ruled that such “gift plans” run afoul of the “absolute priority rule,” which is codified in Section 1129(b) of Bankruptcy Code. The decision has significant implications for future bankruptcy cases in New York.

In a decision that will be of great interest to the creditor community, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, on November 5, 2009, that the Bankruptcy Code does not bar an unsecured claim for post-petition attorneys’ fees that was authorized under a valid prepetition contract. The case, Ogle v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland,1 extends and clarifies the US Supreme Court’s March 2007 decision in the Travelers case,2 which opened the door for such a ruling.

In Re: Katherine Elizabeth Barnet, No. 13-612 (2d Cir. Dec. 11, 2013) [click for opinion]

Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Arcapita, Bank. B.S.C. v. Bahr. Islamic Bank, No. 15-cv-03828 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2016) [click for opinion]

In December 2013, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held as a matter of first impression in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013), that section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires a debtor “under this title” to have a domicile, a place of business, or property in the U.S., applies in cases under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in In re Motors Liquidation Company is yet the latest case to show the difficulty in using the bankruptcy process to resolve tort claims.[1]

The Background Basics

On August 31, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in favour of Argentina’s Central Bank in one of the many proceedings initiated by Argentina’s unpaid bondholders.[1] The decision in EM Ltd. and NML Capital Ltd v. Banco Central De La Republica Argentina[2] reinforces the statutory presumption in favour of States’ instrumentalities sovereign immunity, and sets a very high threshold to rebut it.

Swiss Investigating Magistrate Entitled to U.S. Documents