The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Bankruptcy Court decision that invalidated the use by creditors of so-called “triangular”, or non-mutual, setoffs in which obligations are offset among not only the parties to a bilateral contract but also their affiliates. In re SemCrude, L.P., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42477 (D. Del.
On May 5, 2009, Judge James Peck, the Bankruptcy Judge in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases, held that the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not override the mutuality requirements for setoff under section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court prohibited Swedbank, a non-debtor counter party to a swap agreement, from setting off pre-petition claims against Lehman against funds collected for Lehman’s account postpetition. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Bankr. Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.
In a recent ruling from the bench, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that Metavante Corporation’s suspension of payments under an outstanding swap agreement with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.
In a recently filed motion in the United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York (the “Motion”), Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) is seeking to compel Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to perform its obligations under a swap agreement between Metavante and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.
In Hutson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
Earlier this year, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that a nondebtor cannot effect a “triangular” setoff of the amounts owed between it and three affiliated debtors, even if the parties had entered into pre-petition contracts that expressly contemplated multiparty setoff.1 In reaching its decision, the Court relied principally on the plain language of section 553(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which limits setoff to “mutual” obligations — i.e., direct obligations between a single obligor and obligee.
Client Alert
The Bankruptcy Code gives a bankruptcy trustee, or the debtor in possession, the power to “avoid” certain transfers made by the debtor at various times before filing for bankruptcy relief.
The reforms introducing a safe harbour for directors of insolvent companies and, from 1 July 2018, a limited stay on the operation of ipso facto clauses have been passed by both Houses of the Australian Parliament and will likely be enacted by month end. Late on Monday evening, after some debate, the Senate passed the reforms with only minor amendments. The Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 2) Bill 2017 then returned to the House of Representatives who formally passed the amended Bill last night.
Safe harbour