Introduction

In February 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion that, at first blush, appeared to severely curtail the scope of the transferee protections provided by Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments from a bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers, including transfers “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a “financial institution” in connection with a “securities contract.” A recent decision from the Second Circuit breathes fresh life into the defense.

The Bottom Line:

This alert describes issues to consider when a derivatives dealer counterparty becomes insolvent.We address below issues involving termination of a master agreement, close-out netting of underlying trades and collateral. Even though this alert focuses on the bankruptcy of a dealer, many of the issues would also arise in connection with the bankruptcy of most non-dealer counterparties.

1. Existence of an Event of Default and Termination

a. Existence of an Event of Default

Court holds that distributions made pursuant to priority payment provisions contained in CDO transactions are protected by Section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code

While the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provision in section 546(e) previously provided comfort for brokerdealers, the Bankruptcy Court’s decision in Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. (In re Manhattan Investment Fund, Ltd.), 359 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), chips away at this provision and creates new risks for those providing brokerage account services. Always at risk as a deep pocket, new duties have been thrust upon brokerdealers that go far beyond the terms of the account agreement.

Factual Background

On October 4, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that a contractual right of a triangular (non-mutual) setoff was unenforceable in bankruptcy, even though the contract was safe harbored. In re Lehman Brothers, Inc., No. 08-01420 (JMP), 2011 WL 4553015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011).

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Bankruptcy Court decision that invalidated the use by creditors of so-called “triangular”, or non-mutual, setoffs in which obligations are offset among not only the parties to a bilateral contract but also their affiliates. In re SemCrude, L.P., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42477 (D. Del.

On May 5, 2009, Judge James Peck, the Bankruptcy Judge in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases, held that the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not override the mutuality requirements for setoff under section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court prohibited Swedbank, a non-debtor counter party to a swap agreement, from setting off pre-petition claims against Lehman against funds collected for Lehman’s account postpetition. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Bankr. Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.

In a recent ruling from the bench, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that Metavante Corporation’s suspension of payments under an outstanding swap agreement with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.