The Supreme Court unanimously held on March 20, 2007, that an unsecured lender could recover contractbased legal fees “incurred in [post-bankruptcy] litigation” on “issues of bankruptcy law.” Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., __ U.S. __ (March 20, 2007). Op., at 1, 3. In doing so, the court vacated a summary ruling by the Ninth Circuit last year. 167 Fed. Appx. 593 (9th Cir. 2006) (held, “attorney fees… not recoverable in bankruptcy for litigating issues ‘peculiar to federal bankruptcy law.’“), citing In re Fobian, 951 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir.

On Dec. 16, 2021, U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon in the Southern District of New York vacated Purdue Pharma’s confirmed plan of reorganization after finding that the Bankruptcy Court below did not have statutory authority to issue a confirmation order granting non-consensual third-party releases — namely for the benefit of the Sackler family who owns Purdue. In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., Case No. 7:21-cv-08566 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2021).

Courts frequently dismiss creditor appeals of bankruptcy confirmation orders as equitably moot. However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently departed from this historic practice. In reversing a District Court determination that confirmation of a plan rendered a creditor’s appeal equitably moot, the Eighth Circuit held that motions to dismiss for equitable mootness should be “rarely granted,” and it reversed and remanded the lower courts’ dismissal of a creditor’s appeal of a Plan Confirmation Order on equitable mootness grounds.

On May 29, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in the Radlax Gateway Hotel bankruptcy proceeding regarding the viability of a plan of reorganization that prohibited a bank from credit-bidding on the debtors’ assets.  See Radlax Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al., v. Amalgamated Bank, __S.Ct.__ No. 11-166, 2012 WL 1912197 (U.S. May 29, 2012)(hereinafter “Opinion at * ___”).  The debtors in Radlax (“Debtors”) purchased a hotel at the Los Angeles International Airport, along with an adjacent property.

On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court issued a ruling that has sent waves through bankruptcy courts across the nation. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011), is the latest opinion in a long running dispute between the estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall, better known as Anna Nicole Smith, and the estate of her late husband’s son, Pierce Marshall.

The United States Supreme Court recently narrowed the scope of the authority of bankruptcy courts, with potential far-reaching implications on past, present and future bankruptcy matters. The case, Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011), began as a dispute between Anna Nicole Smith and the son of her late husband. After several years of litigation and one previous trip to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court ruled bankruptcy courts lack the authority to enter judgments on counterclaims against a debtor that are based on state law.

Summary

In an 11 page opinion published May 18, 2011, Judge Shannon ruled that, in the context of a motion to dismiss, the officer of a corporation, which is itself a contractor, is not also a contractor by virtue of her position within the corporation. Judge Shannon’s opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).

Background

Introduction

This afternoon, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg issued an order extending the temporary stay placed by a federal appeals court in New York last week on the sale of Chrysler LLC’s assets to a new company, to be partially owned by Italian automaker Fiat S.p.A., to allow opponents to the sale sufficient time to seek Supreme Court review.

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that bankrupt trademark licensors cannot use federal bankruptcy law to rescind the rights of their trademark licensees to continue use of duly licensed trademarks. The decision settles a long-simmering circuit split on a question that the International Trademark Association has labelled “the most significant unresolved legal issue in trademark licensing.”