In a recent holding that a creditor may collect, on an unsecured basis, post-petition attorneys’ fees under an otherwise enforceable pre-petition contract, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals followed a similar ruling by the Ninth Circuit earlier this year, adding to a conflict among the circuits on this issue.

The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1

What is a Structured Dismissal?

The case of Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), No. 12- 1200, was easily one of the most closely watched bankruptcy cases in many years. Last week’s decision in that case, however, was far less dramatic than  some practitioners feared it might be. The Supreme Court answered two important questions regarding the power of bankruptcy courts that it left open three years ago in Stern v. Marshall.

On June 7th, the US Supreme Court addressed the calculation of a Chapter 13 debtor's projected "disposable income" under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. When a bankruptcy court calculates a debtor's projected disposable income, the court may account for changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation. Hamilton v. Lanning.  

On May 18th, the Second Circuit, applying the Supreme Court's holding in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S., 130 S.Ct. 1324 (2010), reversed a trial court order finding that provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act that prohibit debt relief agencies from advising clients to incur more debt were overbroad and unconstitutional when applied to attorneys.

The scenario has become all too familiar in recent years: a borrower defaults on a loan and, when the lender pursues the loan collateral through foreclosure or other proceedings, the borrower files for bankruptcy protection. More often than not, when the lender appears in bankruptcy court to pursue its interest in the collateral, the borrower counterattacks with a host of state law lender liability claims.

The Supreme Court of Delaware recently held that creditors of insolvent Delaware limited liability companies (LLCs) lack standing to bring derivative suits on behalf of the LLCs.

In March 2010, CML V brought both derivative and direct claims against the present and former managers of JetDirect Aviation Holdings LLC in the Court of Chancery after JetDirect defaulted on its loan obligations to CML. The Vice Chancellor dismissed all the claims, finding that, as a creditor, CML lacked standing to bring derivative claims on behalf of JetDirect, and CML appealed.

In connection with recognition, PT Bakrie’s foreign representative sought an order from the Bankruptcy Court enforcing its Indonesian PKPU Plan. The foreign representative argued that the plan provided a discharge of the debtor, and all other parties, from any liability in respect of the intercompany loans at issue. By seeking enforcement of the PKPU Plan, the foreign representative effectively sought a release of non-debtor third parties from liability to the Objecting Noteholders and others, including in respect of the approximate $161 million stipulated judgment.

On June 4, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lamar Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling,[1] resolving a circuit split on the issue of whether a debtor’s statement about a single asset constitutes “a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).

Alerts and Updates

The Supreme Court’s opinion is significant because it will encourage creditors to rely on written, rather than oral, statements of debtors as to both their assets and overall financial status, which are better evidence in a nondischargeability case.