A person in possession of a debtor’s property upon a bankruptcy filing now has more guidance from the Supreme Court as to the effect of the automatic stay. In City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021), handed down on January 14 of 2021, the Court was faced with the issue of whether the City of Chicago (the “City”) was liable for violation of the automatic stay for refusing to return vehicles it impounded pre-petition. Issuing a narrow decision under Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that it was not.

The Bankruptcy Protector

In 2017, Congress enacted an amendment imposing a sharp increase in quarterly fees owed to the United States Trustee program by many chapter 11 debtors. Expectedly, the constitutionality of that decision has been challenged on several grounds, and there is considerable disagreement among the circuits.

This article first appeared in Law360.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued an opinion in Delaware Trust Company v. Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc., Wilmington Trust, N.A. (In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.) on June 19, 2019, in which it addressed distributions of assets pursuant to the waterfall provision of an intercreditor agreement in a chapter 11 reorganization.

On March 5, 2018 the United State Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in U.S. Bank NA v. The Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. ___ (2018), answering the narrow question of what is the proper standard of review for appellate courts in reviewing a bankruptcy court’s determination of non-statutory insider status.

On February 27, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. The key issue in the case was the scope of Section 546(e) of the bankruptcy code which insulates certain transactions from a bankruptcy trustee’s statutory avoidance powers. A bankruptcy trustee may avoid many types of pre-petition transfers, including preferential payments made to creditors within 90 days of a bankruptcy petition and transfers made for less than reasonably equivalent value completed within two years of a bankruptcy filing.

In bankruptcy, one of the “powers” granted to a trustee is the ability to undo previously completed transactions in order to facilitate payments to creditors. However, the Bankruptcy Code prevents a trustee from unwinding certain types of transactions. The safe harbor provision of 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) protects financial institutions performing securities transactions from having to disgorge payments initially made by a now bankrupt company.

The Bankruptcy Protector

Back in September, the Bankruptcy Protector announced that was introducing a new periodic series: theJevic Files. As promised, we have published intermittent updates identifying cases where Jevic priority skipping issues are raised and adjudicated.

In this post, we attempt to provide a succinct summary of all cases decided post-Jevic.

How Courts Are Applying Jevic

The U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral argument today inU.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge (15-1509). At issue in the case is whether the appropriate standard of review for determining non-statutory insider status is the de novo standard of review applied by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 3rd, 7th and 10th Circuits, or the clearly erroneous standard of review adopted for the first time by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Village at Lake Ridge.

The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), which arose from the restructuring proceedings of Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd. and was released on December 6, 2010, is a landmark decision in Canadian insolvency law.