The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in Stern v. Marshall1 that a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to render a final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s counterclaim against a creditor based on state common law, despite an express statutory grant of jurisdiction. This ruling is the most significant decision regarding bankruptcy court jurisdiction since the Court’s 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline v. Marathon2 and it could significantly affect the administration of bankruptcy cases.

Root of the Constitutional Problem

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion that potentially broadens the proximate cause element of claims brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO’s proximate cause element requires a plaintiff to allege facts plausibly establishing that there is a “direct relationship” between the claimed injury and the defendant’s conduct in violation of RICO.

Currently, some courts allow borrowers to bring Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims for non-judicial foreclosures while other courts do not, but that is about to change.

On October 26, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in the case of Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, to decide the issue of whether a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a trademark license agreement under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code terminates the rights of the licensee to use the applicable trademarks. No. 17-1657, 2018 WL 2939184 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2018). The appeal arises from a decision by the U.S.

The Bankruptcy Code gives a bankruptcy trustee, or the debtor in possession, the power to “avoid” certain transfers made by the debtor at various times before filing for bankruptcy relief.

Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Czyewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S.Ct. 973, 197 L.Ed.2d 398 (2017), one way to reshuffle the deck chairs on the titanic in a case with too little money, no more assets and too many creditors was for the parties to divvy up the remains through a structured dismissal under Section 349 of the Bankruptcy Code.

On June 28, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge to a Third Circuit-affirmed settlement and dismissal of the chapter 11 cases of Jevic Transportation, Inc. (“Jevic”) and certain of its affiliates. SeeOfficial Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. grantedCzyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 2016 WL 3496769 (U.S. 2016).

On Monday, May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, — S. Ct. —, 2016 WL 2842452 (2016) resolving a split between the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding the scope of the “actual fraud” exception to an individual debtor’s bankruptcy discharge. In relevant part, Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits debtors from discharging “any debt . . . for money, property, [or] services . . . to the extent obtained, by . . .

On Monday, May 20, 2019, the United States Supreme Court issued an 8-1 decision holding that a bankrupt company’s decision to reject an existing license of its trademarks does not terminate a licensee’s right to continue using the licensed trademarks.

The economic value of IP rights in US bankruptcy proceedings has risen rapidly. Due to Congress's unique view of trademark licenses, appellate courts are increasingly divided on the ability both of debtor-owners to freely reject them, and of licensees to continue to use them. In In re Tempnology LLC,1 the Supreme Court has been asked to provide much-needed certainty on these issues.