The economic value of IP rights in US bankruptcy proceedings has risen rapidly. Due to Congress's unique view of trademark licenses, appellate courts are increasingly divided on the ability both of debtor-owners to freely reject them, and of licensees to continue to use them. In In re Tempnology LLC,1 the Supreme Court has been asked to provide much-needed certainty on these issues.

On Dec. 16, 2021, U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon in the Southern District of New York vacated Purdue Pharma’s confirmed plan of reorganization after finding that the Bankruptcy Court below did not have statutory authority to issue a confirmation order granting non-consensual third-party releases — namely for the benefit of the Sackler family who owns Purdue. In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., Case No. 7:21-cv-08566 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2021).

Courts frequently dismiss creditor appeals of bankruptcy confirmation orders as equitably moot. However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently departed from this historic practice. In reversing a District Court determination that confirmation of a plan rendered a creditor’s appeal equitably moot, the Eighth Circuit held that motions to dismiss for equitable mootness should be “rarely granted,” and it reversed and remanded the lower courts’ dismissal of a creditor’s appeal of a Plan Confirmation Order on equitable mootness grounds.

A secured lender's "mere retention of property [after a pre-bankruptcy repossession] does not violate" the automatic stay provision [362(a) (3)] of the Bankruptcy Code, held a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court on Jan. 14, 2021. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 2021 WL 125106, 4 ( Jan. 14, 2021). Reversing the Seventh Circuit's affirmance of a bankruptcy court judgment holding a secured lender in contempt for violating the automatic stay, the Court resolved "a split" in the Circuits. Id. at 2. The Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits had agreed with the Seventh Circuit.

The debtors' legal malpractice claim was "not property of their bankruptcy estate," held a split Ninth Circuit on June 30, 2020. In re Glaser, 816 Fed. Appx. 103, 104 (9th Cir. June 30, 2020) (2-1). But the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota one week later affirmed a bankruptcy court judgment that "the [debtor's] estate was the proper owner" of such a claim. In re Bruess, 2020 WL3642324, 1 (D. Minn. July 6, 2020).

A secured lender’s “mere retention of property [after a pre-bankruptcy–repossession] does not violate” the automatic stay provision [§ 362(a)(3)] of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”), held a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court on Jan. 14, 2021. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 2021 WL 125106, *4 (Jan. 14,2021). Reversing the Seventh Circuit’s affirmance of a bankruptcy court judgment holding a secured lender in contempt for violating the automatic stay, the Court resolved “a split” in the Circuits. Id., at *2. The Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits had agreed with the Seventh Circuit.

The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “does not limit the allowability of unsecured claims for contractual post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees,” held the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware on Nov. 26, 2018. In re Tribune Media Company, 2018 WL 6167504 (D. Del. Nov. 26, 2018). In a short and sensible opinion, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s disallowance of an undersecured lender’s fees.

The securities safe harbor protection of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 546(e) does not protect allegedly fraudulent “transfers in which financial institutions served as mere conduits,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on Feb. 27, 2018. Merit Management Group LP v. FTI Consulting Inc., 2018 WL 1054879, *7 (2018). Affirming the Seventh Circuit’s reinstatement of the bankruptcy trustee’s complaint alleging the insolvent debtor’s overpayment for a stock interest, the Court found the payment not covered by §546(e) and thus recoverable. The district court had dismissed the trustee’s claim.

The United States Supreme Court, on July 1, 2014, granted a petition for certiorari in an important Seventh Circuit case limiting the power of bankruptcy courts to decide property disputes. Wellness International Network, Ltd. et al. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2013). The Seventh Circuit had held last year that the bankruptcy court lacked the constitutional authority to determine whether purported trust assets were property of the debtor’s estate.

The United States Supreme Court, on June 9, 2014, unanimously held that certain “core” proceedings (e.g., fraudulent transfer suits ) could still be litigated in the bankruptcy court, but only if that court’s proposed fact findings and legal conclusions are subject to de novo review by the district court. Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), 2014 WL 2560461 (U.S. Sup. Court, June 9, 2014).