The Bottom Line

The United States Supreme Court recently issued a unanimous decision in Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, No. 19-938 589 U.S. __ (2020), which held that a bankruptcy court’s unreserved denial of a motion for relief from the automatic stay is a final, immediately appealable order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 158.

What Happened

Introduction

In February 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion that, at first blush, appeared to severely curtail the scope of the transferee protections provided by Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments from a bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers, including transfers “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a “financial institution” in connection with a “securities contract.” A recent decision from the Second Circuit breathes fresh life into the defense.

On May 20, 2019, in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019), the Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuits, holding that a licensor’s rejection of a trademark license in bankruptcy constitutes a prepetition breach, but does not terminate the license.

In another decision affecting Chapter 11 cases, U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge, --- S. Ct. ---, 2018 WL 1143822 (2018), on March 5, 2018, the United States Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Kagan, affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision to review the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of a mixed question of fact and law for clear error, rather than de novo.

On February 27, 2018, the Supreme Court handed down a unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Sotomayor, resolving a Circuit split over the interpretation of Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution from avoidance on fraudulent transfer grounds.

This two-part article discusses the key concerns, from a non-consolidation and true sale perspective, that arise when an insurance company, as opposed to a bankruptcy-eligible entity, is a sponsor/seller in a securitization or similar structured finance transaction. This Part One introduces the main contrasts between non-con and true sale analysis in a traditional bankruptcy context and such analysis in an insurance-law scenario.

The Bottom Line

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Merit Management Group L.P. v. FTI Consulting Inc. to resolve a circuit split over the interpretation of Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution from avoidance on fraudulent transfer grounds.

In a much anticipated decision issued on March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court determined in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (Jevic) that a “structured dismissal” of a bankruptcy case cannot include a distribution scheme to creditors that does not comply with the priorities provided for under the Bankruptcy Code. The decision looks at the policy underlying “basic priority rules” in bankruptcy cases and, in doing so, throws into question the future use of negotiated settlements in bankruptcy cases where some, but not all, creditors receive a benefit.

The Bottom Line: