In a recent decision, Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts1, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a debtor has an absolute right under Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to convert a case to Chapter 13, clarifying a growing split among circuits as to whether the debtor’s bad faith conduct prior to his proposed conversion results in the forfeiture of the debtor’s right to convert.

On March 20, 2007, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., case docket no. 127 S.Ct. 1199 (2007), that federal bankruptcy law does not preclude an unsecured creditor from obtaining attorney’s fees authorized by a valid prepetition contract and incurred in postpetition litigation. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s ruling in Fobian v. Western Farm Credit Bank (In re Fobian), 951 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir.

We have previously written about Siegel v. Fitzgerald, No. 21-441, the Supreme Court case considering the question of whether the 2018 difference in fees between Bankruptcy Administrator judicial districts and U.S. Trustee judicial districts was consistent with the Constitution’s uniformity requirement for bankruptcy laws.

Unsecured creditors and other stakeholders sometimes challenge the reasonableness of fees incurred by estate professionals in a bankruptcy case. Whether this is to augment unsecured creditor recoveries or serve as a check on the private bar is in the eye of the beholder. Whatever the reason, fee litigation in bankruptcy caused many professionals to seek payment from the bankruptcy estate for any fees incurred defending against an objection to their fees.

The doctrine of equitable mootness is in the news again. The Supreme Court recently denied a cert. petition in a case where the petitioner wanted the doctrine ruled unconstitutional. KK-PB Financial LLC v. 160 Royal Palm LLC, Case No. 21-1197, 2021 WL 7247541 (petition), 2022 WL 1914118, (denying certiorari).

A discharge in bankruptcy usually discharges a debtor from the debtor’s liabilities. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, however, sets forth certain exceptions to this policy, including for “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

As we reported, on June 21, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to revisit the rigid Brunner standard for determining “undue hardship” capable of discharging student debt. The same day, United States Bankruptcy Judge Michelle M.

On Monday, the United States Supreme Court denied Thelma McCoy’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, passing up a golden opportunity to bring uniformity to the “important and recurring question” of how to determine the sort of “undue hardship” that qualifies a debtor for a discharge of student loans under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

In March, we reported on a brief filed by the Solicitor General recommending denial of a petition for certiorari filed by Tribune creditors seeking Supreme Court review of the Second Circuit ruling dismissing their state-law fraudulent transfer claims.

State governments can be creditors of individuals, businesses and institutions that are debtors in bankruptcy in a variety of ways, most notably as tax and fine collectors but also as lenders. They can also be debtors of debtors, in their role, for example, as the purchasers of vast quantities of goods and services on credit. And they can also be transferees of a debtor’s property in (at least) every role in which they can be creditors.