The District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Second District, recently held that where loan documents provided that Florida law applied to foreclosure claims, the trial court erred in applying Texas law because the deficiency claim in the case was part of the Florida foreclosure process.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit recently held that a condominium unit owners association did not violate a debtor’s Chapter 7 discharge order by scheduling a sheriff’s sale to complete a prepetition foreclosure.

Rejecting the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the in rem foreclosure sale was scheduled to induce payment of discharged pre-petition condominium fees, the Sixth Circuit BAP noted that “all foreclosure litigation potentially can induce payments of discharged debt to avoid a foreclosure sale.”

The Supreme Court of Ohio recently held that a mortgagee may enforce a mortgage against a mortgagor who signed, initialed, and acknowledged the mortgage even though the body of the mortgage agreement does not identify the mortgagor by name.

In so ruling, the Supreme Court of Ohio allowed a mortgagee to use parole evidence to determine the mortgage signatory’s intent where there is an ambiguity.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the trial court from considering the plaintiff’s claims because she was not challenging or seeking to set aside an underlying non-judicial mortgage foreclosure proceeding under Colorado law.

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit remanded to the trial court to determine what effect, if any, the non-judicial proceeding had under the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy trustee was authorized to sell real estate free and clear of unexpired leases under 11 U.S.C. § 363(f), and the sale was not a rejection of the unexpired leases and therefore did not implicate 11 U.S.C. § 365(h).

In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit adopted the minority approach established in Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003), which held that sections 363 and 365 may be given full effect without coming into conflict with one another.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently held that a confirmable Chapter 13 plan cannot both “vest” title to real property and “surrender” that property to a secured lender, and that the secured lender may refuse to accept the vesting in satisfaction of its claim.

Thus, the Court held that a debtor may not force the transfer of title in collateral to a secured creditor in satisfaction of the secured creditor’s claim, without the consent of the secured creditor.

• A bankruptcy court in Ohio recently applied the incorrect statute of limitations in a mortgage foreclosure action.
• Ohio’s statute of limitations jurisprudence has evolved from an accepted legal proposition derived from one opinion to supposedly well-settled law stating the complete opposite in another opinion.
• Federal courts interpreting Ohio law must apply the correct statute of limitations to mortgage foreclosure actions.

In the bankruptcy case of In re Fisher, 584 B.R. 185, 199–200 (N.D. Ohio Bankr.

The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, recently dismissed a mortgagee’s “breach of mortgage contract” action as an impermissible second refiling following prior voluntary dismissals of a 2011 foreclosure complaint and 2013 action for breach of the promissory note based upon the same note and mortgage.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that a mortgage foreclosure deficiency judgment lien may be avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2), reversing the bankruptcy court’s ruling to the contrary.

A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion. 

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied a creditor’s motion to compel the debtor to surrender mortgaged property and also denied the debtor’s motion to stay the case, holding that a chapter 7 debtor who indicates surrender of real property in his statement of intention is not obligated to surrender that property to the lienholder, whether or not the property is administered by the chapter 7 trustee.