The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held that a title insurer may exclude coverage under the exception for defects “created, suffered, assumed, or agreed to by the insured claimant” without intentional or wrongful conduct by the insured. 

In so ruling, the Court also held that the Illinois statute for bad faith denial of coverage by insurers did not apply to title insurers.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that the word “surrender” in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2), requires that debtors relinquish all of their rights to the collateral.

In so ruling, the Court ordered the borrowers to “surrender” their house to the mortgagee in a foreclosure action, and held that the bankruptcy court had the authority to compel the borrowers to fulfill their mandatory duty under 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) not to oppose a foreclosure action in state court.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that a mortgagee’s failure to take a deficiency judgment against a borrower who filed bankruptcy in a concluded state foreclosure action precluded the mortgagee from making a deficiency claim in the borrower’s bankruptcy proceeding.

A copy of the opinion in BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. Anderson is available at: Link to Opinion.

Reversing the rulings of both the appellate and the trial courts, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois recently held that the deadline to file a motion to quash service under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (IMFL) did not run while the foreclosure action was dismissed for want of prosecution.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

The District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Second District, recently held that where loan documents provided that Florida law applied to foreclosure claims, the trial court erred in applying Texas law because the deficiency claim in the case was part of the Florida foreclosure process.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit recently held that a condominium unit owners association did not violate a debtor’s Chapter 7 discharge order by scheduling a sheriff’s sale to complete a prepetition foreclosure.

Rejecting the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the in rem foreclosure sale was scheduled to induce payment of discharged pre-petition condominium fees, the Sixth Circuit BAP noted that “all foreclosure litigation potentially can induce payments of discharged debt to avoid a foreclosure sale.”

The Supreme Court of Ohio recently held that a mortgagee may enforce a mortgage against a mortgagor who signed, initialed, and acknowledged the mortgage even though the body of the mortgage agreement does not identify the mortgagor by name.

In so ruling, the Supreme Court of Ohio allowed a mortgagee to use parole evidence to determine the mortgage signatory’s intent where there is an ambiguity.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the trial court from considering the plaintiff’s claims because she was not challenging or seeking to set aside an underlying non-judicial mortgage foreclosure proceeding under Colorado law.

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit remanded to the trial court to determine what effect, if any, the non-judicial proceeding had under the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy trustee was authorized to sell real estate free and clear of unexpired leases under 11 U.S.C. § 363(f), and the sale was not a rejection of the unexpired leases and therefore did not implicate 11 U.S.C. § 365(h).

In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit adopted the minority approach established in Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003), which held that sections 363 and 365 may be given full effect without coming into conflict with one another.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently held that a confirmable Chapter 13 plan cannot both “vest” title to real property and “surrender” that property to a secured lender, and that the secured lender may refuse to accept the vesting in satisfaction of its claim.

Thus, the Court held that a debtor may not force the transfer of title in collateral to a secured creditor in satisfaction of the secured creditor’s claim, without the consent of the secured creditor.