The High Court has struck down a company voluntary arrangement on the ground that it unfairly prejudiced a landlord who was to lose the benefit of a guarantee given by the tenant’s parent company. The judge said it was “unreasonable and unfair in principle” to require the landlord to give up the guarantee and there was “no sufficient justification” for requiring the landlord to accept a sum of money in lieu.

In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the election of a tenant, under Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, to remain in possession of real property governed by a rejected lease causes a third-party guaranty on another rejected agreement to remain in effect, to the extent such agreement and the lease are part of an integrated transaction.

Part I -- Introduction

Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Pilevsky et al., is a New York case which gets to the heart of the enforceability of classic single-purpose entity restrictions in commercial real estate lending. At issue is how far a third-party may go to cause a violation of a borrower’s SPE covenants, and whether those covenants are enforceable at all.

A Defaulted Construction Loan and Frustrated Attempts to Foreclose:

Can a profit-sharing provision in a commercial lease survive assumption and assignment by a debtor? Analyzing such a provision, the Third Circuit answered “no,” finding the provision to constitute an unenforceable anti-assignment provision. Haggen Holdings, LLC v. Antone Corp, 739 Fed. Appx. 153 (2018).

Legal and Factual Background

Under section 1111(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a non-recourse secured creditor that holds “a claim secured by a lien on property of the estate” is granted recourse against the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. But what happens when there has been a post-petition foreclosure on such property, so that it is no longer part of the estate and the liens have been extinguished? Can the creditor still use section 1111(b) to assert a claim against the bankruptcy estate? The Ninth Circuit answered no in Matsan v.

• A bankruptcy court in Ohio recently applied the incorrect statute of limitations in a mortgage foreclosure action.
• Ohio’s statute of limitations jurisprudence has evolved from an accepted legal proposition derived from one opinion to supposedly well-settled law stating the complete opposite in another opinion.
• Federal courts interpreting Ohio law must apply the correct statute of limitations to mortgage foreclosure actions.

In the bankruptcy case of In re Fisher, 584 B.R. 185, 199–200 (N.D. Ohio Bankr.

The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, recently dismissed a mortgagee’s “breach of mortgage contract” action as an impermissible second refiling following prior voluntary dismissals of a 2011 foreclosure complaint and 2013 action for breach of the promissory note based upon the same note and mortgage.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that a mortgage foreclosure deficiency judgment lien may be avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2), reversing the bankruptcy court’s ruling to the contrary.

A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion. 

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied a creditor’s motion to compel the debtor to surrender mortgaged property and also denied the debtor’s motion to stay the case, holding that a chapter 7 debtor who indicates surrender of real property in his statement of intention is not obligated to surrender that property to the lienholder, whether or not the property is administered by the chapter 7 trustee.