Mr Justice Zacaroli has handed down his judgment in Carroway Guildford (Nominee A) Limited and 18 others and (1) Regis UK Limited, (2) Edward Williams (as Joint Supervisor of Regis UK Ltd) and (3) Christine Mary Laverty (as Joint Supervisor of Regis UK Ltd) [2021] EWHC 1294 (Ch) following his decision in the New Look challenge last week.

Summary

When a tenant goes into liquidation and its liquidator surrenders the lease what effect does this have on any obligations to remove any alterations that the tenant has made during the term and generally reinstate?  The high court has recently decided that the terms of a surrender that released both parties from rights arising “on or after, but not before, the date of this surrender” were sufficient to release the tenant from its obligations to reinstate the premises because these obligations were future obligations.

Hurstwood Properties (A) Ltd and others (Respondents) v Rossendale Borough Council and another (Appellants)

The Supreme Court has delivered its keenly anticipated judgment in a case concerning the validity of two business rates mitigation schemes. The schemes under scrutiny involved property owners letting unoccupied properties to special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) which benefitted from a business rates exemption and therefore allowed both the property owners and the SPVs to avoid liability for business rates.

In our Law-Now of 4 April 2012 (click here for link), we reported on the decision of the court in the case of Leisure (Norwich) II Limited v Luminar Lava Ignite Limited (in administration).  The detailed judgment has now been released, setting out the rationale for the decision and summarising the position on rents in administration generally.

The legal position on this issue is now:

Applications

Rule 12 sets out rules relating to applications, (excluding administration applications, winding up petitions and creditors' bankruptcy petitions) including:

Disclaimer - Rules 19.1 - 19.11

The Rules relating to Disclaimer remain largely unchanged, except for bankruptcy and liquidation being included in the same section and some minor updates to the Act. The deadlines for all actions remain unchanged.

19.8 - Application for permission to disclaim in bankruptcy (section 315(4))

The notes in this section refer to changes within the Act as amended by the Deregulation Act 2015 and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.

For the benefit of our clients and friends investing in European distressed opportunities, our European Network is sharing some current developments

Recent Developments

(Bankr. S.D. Ind. Feb. 10, 2017)

The bankruptcy court enters judgment in favor of the debtor on the trustee’s claims to avoid transfers of real property, but the court enters judgment in favor of the trustee on the claim under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) and denies the debtor a discharge. The court finds that the debtor made a false oath on his statement of financial affairs with reckless disregard for the truth. The debtor had transferred property prior to his divorce but claimed those transfers were made as a result of the divorce. Opinion below.

Judge: Moberly

(7th Cir. Dec. 21, 2016)

The Seventh Circuit affirms the bankruptcy court’s judgment that certain real property of the debtor was exempt because it was held in a tenancy by the entirety under Illinois law. The creditor argued that the tenancy by the entirety was severed when the real property had been transferred to a trust prepetition. The Seventh Circuit examines applicable Illinois statutes and concludes that the transfer did not sever the tenancy by the entirety. Opinion below

Judge: Posner

Attorney for Debtor: Kofkin Law, Scott J. Kofkin

(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 22, 2016)

The bankruptcy court grants the creditor’s motion to modify the stay to allow the creditor to proceed with the state court real property foreclosure action. The court finds that cause exists for stay relief for reasons including that this second bankruptcy filing by the debtor was pending for three months, the debtor’s plan depended on a sale of the property, the debtor had not taken any action to proceed with the sale, and there was no proof that the debtor’s spouse (co-owner of the property) would consent to the sale. Opinion below.