In re Solitron Devices, Inc., 510 B.R. 890 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2014) –
A Chapter 11 debtor moved to reopen its bankruptcy case more than 15 years after it was closed in order to enforce the plan confirmation order to prevent claims by a state environmental agency and other potentially responsible parties for clean-up costs at a landfill.
In re Grubb & Ellis Co., 478 B.R. 622 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) –
Real estate agents who worked for Grubb & Ellis Co. prior to its bankruptcy sought allowance of their claims for commissions as an administrative expense. Grubb & Ellis addresses the question of whether a commission due for a sale that closes post-petition where the buyer was procured prepetition is entitled to treatment as an administrative expense.
In S. White Transportation, by remaining silent until after confirmation, a mortgagee managed to retain its lien notwithstanding the debtor’s attempt to discharge it through a plan of reorganization.
In the well-publicized opinion of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC et al., 599 F. 3d 298 (3rd Cir. 2010), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,1 held that Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)2 is unambiguous and is to be read in the disjunctive, thus allowing a proponent of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization to use the "cram down" power under subsection (iii) of that Section without allowing a secured creditor to credit bid on a sale proposed as part of the plan.
The macroeconomic impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) on nearly all industries is forcing businesses directly and indirectly affected by the global pandemic to consider restructuring alternatives. Since prospective businesses looking to reorganize or liquidate through the chapter 11 process are likely to need immediate cash in order to operate their businesses, these companies often will look to existing or third-party lenders (and in certain cases, stalking horse bidders or customer groups) to provide them with debtor-in-possession financing (DIP Financing).
It is well settled that the purpose of filing a bankruptcy petition is to “give[] the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, (1934). A debtor’s discharge in bankruptcy, and the corresponding injunction provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, are the two primary elements that effectuate this financial fresh start.Chapman v. Bituminous Ins. Co. (In re Coho Res., Inc.), 345 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2003).
On August 20, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois in In re I80 Equipment, LLC, No.17-81749, 2018 WL 4006294 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2018) held that a secured party failed to perfect its security interest due to an insufficient description of the collateral listed in its UCC-1 financing statement. The financing statement failed to sufficiently describe the collateral because it referenced the definition of “collateral” in the underlying security agreement without attaching the security agreement to the financing statement.
In re RML Dev., Inc., 528 B.R. 150 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2014) –
A mortgagee sought to modify a sale order to (1) modify the bid procedures and (2) confirm that it had a right to credit bid.