On September 21, 2010, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited leave to appeal a decision of the Bankruptcy Court in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy case.1 The Bankruptcy Court held that a key provision of certain transaction documents constituted an unenforceable ipso facto clause. The District Court granted leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court decision even though it was interlocutory.

Introduction

Several recent bankruptcy decisions rendered in the Third Circuit address whether the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure apply to informal or “ad hoc” committees.1 Although these courts base their reasoning on the “plain meaning” of Rule 2019, their ultimate holdings are inconsistent and have generated renewed interest in this topic among lenders and the investing community. This article provides a brief summary of these recent decisions and examines their inconsistencies.

In In re City of Vallejo,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California held recently that the City of Vallejo has the authority to reject its collective bargaining agreements with the city’s firefighters and electrical workers as part of its chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding without going through the process detailed in section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court determined that a municipality does not need to comply with the stringent requirements that corporations face when seeking to reject a collective bargaining agreement (a “CBA”).

In ABN Amro Bank N.V. v. Parmalat Finanziara S.p.A. (In re Parmalat Finanziara S.p.A.),1 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of an injunction pursuant to former section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code (the precursor to current chapter 15, applicable in crossborder insolvency proceedings), which prevented the beneficiary of a guaranty governed by New York law from asserting its guaranty claim against Italian debtor (and guarantor) Parmalat S.p.A. (“Parmalat”) in the United States.

Introduction

In Oneida Ltd. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (In re Oneida Ltd.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York addressed whether a premium payment created by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (“DRA”)2 for pension plans terminated as part of a chapter 11 restructuring is a pre-petition claim or a post-petition administrative expense. The Court held that the statutorily mandated premium payment was a contingent pre-petition claim and was discharged upon confirmation of the debtor’s plan.

Congress enacted amendments to the United States Bankruptcy Code in 2005 designed to increase certainty in the marketplace for mortgage loan repurchase agreements and other financial contracts.1 The contours – and limits – of these amendments were recently explored by the Delaware bankruptcy court in Calyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp.

Australia is a member of both the Basel Committee and the G20 and in November, Brisbane was host to the G20 Leaders' Summit.

The agenda focussed on increasing global growth, jobs and economic stability.  Despite the positive G20 intentions, David Cameron was quoted as saying "red warning lights are once again flashing on the dashboard of the global economy".

On December 4, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit added to the growing body of case law delineating the extent of bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction in the wake the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall.

On August 28, 2012, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas vacated a series of bankruptcy court rulings that had blocked Vitro SAB’s noteholders from filing involuntary bankruptcy petitions against Vitro’s non-debtor subsidiary guarantors.  In a decision authored by Chief Judge Sidney A.

On June 28, 2012, Judge Allan Gropper of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York declined to appoint an official committee of equity holders in Kodak’s chapter 11 cases.  The bankruptcy court determined that the appointment of an official committee was not warranted at that time, given that the costs to the bankruptcy estates would be substantial and equity’s interests were already represented by other constituencies seeking to maximize value and by a sophisticatedad hoc group of shareholders.  In re Eastman Kodak Company, Case No