The Bottom Line
The Bottom Line
The Bottom Line
The District Court for the Northern District of Texas recently held in Segner v. Ruthven Oil & Gas, LLC, No. 3:12-CV-1318-B, 2018 WL 3155827 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2018) that failure to comply with a disclosure law when documenting a transaction does not deprive a defendant in a fraudulent transfer action from asserting a good faith defense.
What Happened?
On February 27, 2018, the Supreme Court handed down a unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Sotomayor, resolving a Circuit split over the interpretation of Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution from avoidance on fraudulent transfer grounds.
The Bottom Line
The Bottom Line
In January 2017, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its widely reported opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC vs. Education Management Corp., in which the majority held that the “right ... to receive payment” set forth in Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA) prohibits only nonconsensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms and does not protect the practical ability of bondholders to recover payment.
Background
Borrowers, agent banks, syndicate members and secondary market purchasers incur, syndicate, sell and buy bank debt on the assumption that bank debt is not a “security.” However, a June 30, 2016, opinion in the General Motors preference litigation1shows that such an assumption may no longer be valid, at least under the Bankruptcy Code.
The Bottom Line:
Bottom Line:
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina in In re Barnwell County Hospital, No. 11-06207 (Bankr. D.S.C. Oct. 27, 2011) held that anad hoc community group of citizens formed for the purpose of attempting to keep the Barnwell County hospital open and operating in its current location (the “Community Group”) was not a party-in-interest in the hospital’s bankruptcy case and so lacked standing to challenge the debtor’s eligibility for relief under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.