This past May, in a highly-anticipated decision, the Supreme Court held in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC that a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code has the same effect as a breach of contract outside of bankruptcy.
Earlier this month, the Supreme Court announced that it will review the scope of Bankruptcy Code section 546(e)’s safe harbor provision. Section 546(e) protects from avoidance those transfers that are made “by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution, except where there is actual fraud. The safe harbor is intended to ensure the stability of the securities market in the event of corporate restructurings.
Lending credence to the old adage “if it’s too good to be true, then it probably is,” the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that a secured lender was on inquiry notice of possible fraud by its borrower in impermissibly pledging customers’ assets to secure loans. And the penalty was steep—the Court determined the pledge to be a fraudulent transfer to the lender and the lender’s failure to act upon inquiry notice destroyed the lender’s good faith defense. As a result, the lender’s $300 million secured claim was reduced to a near-worthless general unsecured claim.
In a recent decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, Weisfelner, v. Fund 1, et al. (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 159 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
The secured lender industry experienced a collective sigh of relief on May 29 after the Supreme Court ruled in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al. v. Amalgamated Bank that credit bidding remains a viable option to protect collateral in a cramdown bankruptcy plan. Expressly inscribed in Sections 363(k) and 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, credit bidding has long been understood as a fairly uncontroversial right; until recently.
Part 2: Amendments Affecting Mortgage Lenders and Landlords
As discussed in a previous post, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (the “Act”), which was enacted on December 27, 2020 in response to the economic distress caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, amended numerous provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. This post discusses amendments specifically affecting landlords.
On May 20, 2019, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a debtor-licensor’s ‘rejection’ of a trademark license agreement under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code does not terminate the licensee’s rights to continue to use the trademark. The decision, issued in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, resolved a split among the Circuits, but may spawn additional issues regarding non-debtor contractual rights in bankruptcy.
The Court Tells Debtors, “No Take Backs”
As noted in a recent Distressing Matters post, the United States Supreme Court in In re Jevic Holding Corp. held that debtors cannot use structured dismissals to make payments to creditors in violation of ordinary bankruptcy distribution priority rules.
It is a familiar scenario: a company is on the verge of bankruptcy, bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and unable to negotiate a new agreement. However, this time, an analysis of this distressed scenario prompted a new question: does it matter if the CBA is already expired, i.e., does the Bankruptcy Code distinguish between a CBA that expires pre-petition versus one that has not lapsed?