Debtor’s Chapter 11 counsel cannot be compensated for services performed after a trustee is appointed and the debtor removed from possession.

• That’s the rule of law in the Fifth Circuit and in a not-for-publication decision of the Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, based on a U.S. Supreme Court ruling.

So . . . the question is, what about Subchapter V? Does that same no-compensation rule apply in Subchapter V when the debtor is removed from possession?

Ninth Circuit BAP Opinion

As you know from our prior alerts, creditors of borrowers formed as Delaware LLCs (as opposed to corporations) lack standing under Delaware law to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties even when, to the surprise of many, the LLC is insolvent. See our prior Alert. The disparity of substantive creditor rights depending entirely on corporate form results from two aspects of Delaware law.

The jurisdiction to grant an anti-suit injunction (ASI) arises in two broad categories of case:

• Where a claimant can invoke a contractual provision conferring on him the right to be sued in a particular forum;
• Where the claimant can point to clearly unconscionable conduct or threat of unconscionable conduct on the part of the party sought to be restrained.

(see Seismic Shipping Inc & Anor v Total E & P UK plc (The Western Regent) 2005 EWCA Civ 985)

The Belgian Constitutional Court addressed in a recent judgment the treatment of creditors in a collective debt settlement procedure. The central question was whether a different treatment of creditors, depending on whether they benefit from security over financial collateral, can be justified by objective criteria and whether this aligns with the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination.

Since the court finds the different treatment unconstitutional, the judgment impacts the enforcement rights of pledgees of financial collateral granted by private individuals.

In a world of business, unforeseen circumstances can often arise that lead a company to financial distress or near insolvency. During such times, the appointment of a receiver is a common legal remedy that serves to protect the interests of lenders.

The Legal Statement applies areas of insolvency law to digital assets, providing valuable guidance on the approach English courts will take.

The role of a liquidator comes with its own set of challenges and the computation of their fee is no exception. This article delves into a legal battle between a liquidator and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board (“IBBI”) concerning the Board’s clarifications[1] on fee calculation. The crux of the dispute?

At a hearing in mid-March, the Delaware bankruptcy court held Camshaft Capital Fund, LP, Camshaft Capital Advisors, LLC, Camshaft Capital Management (collectively, “Camshaft”) and William Cameron Morton, principal of Camshaft, in civil contempt. The case is noteworthy because the court not only imposed monetary sanctions but also ordered civil confinement to compel Camshaft and Morton to comply with the court’s prior discovery order. The court issued a supplementary opinion on April 3, 2024, after Camshaft appealed.

The UK Jurisdiction Taskforce (UKJT) has published its "Legal Statement on Digital Assets and English Insolvency Law." The Statement confirms the view that digital assets are a form of personal property to which insolvency laws apply. It also affirms that the current approach taken by the English courts to determine whether they are the appropriate venue for the commencement of insolvency proceedings works for a company dealing in digital assets.

In the case of Re China Properties Group Limited (in Liquidation) [2023] HKCFI 2346, the Hong Kong Court has shown its commitment to providing assistance to local liquidators appointed by it by asserting in personam jurisdiction over a Hong Kong based director of a company incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction.