The influential Delaware bankruptcy court issued a recent decision that all secured lenders need to be aware of. In this decision, the bankruptcy court held that the fees of the official creditors’ committee were not limited by the dollar-amount cap in the financing order because the debtors confirmed their chapter 11 plan. The creditors’ committee argued that it was entitled to over $8 million in fees while the secured lender asserted that the committee’s fees were capped at $250,000 due to what the bankruptcy court referred to as a “standard carve-out provision” in the financing order.

This week the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its highly-anticipated ruling in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Corp. (“Marblegate”). At issue in Marblegate was whether Education Management Corp. (“EDMC”) violated the Trust Indenture Act when it implemented a restructuring that impaired the rights of Marblegate Asset Management, LLC (“MAM”). The Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision in favor of MAM, and held that EDMC’s restructuring did not violate the TIA.

(6th Cir. B.A.P. Jan. 17, 2017)

On January 17, 2017, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in favor of the defendant in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp.1, by vacating the decision of the District Court for the Southern District of New York (the "District Court") and finding that "Section 316(b) [of the Trust Indenture Act] prohibits only non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms." This decision, combined with the recent ruling of the District Court in granting a motion to dismiss in Waxman v. Cliffs Natural Resources Inc.

Court holds that TIA § 316(b) prohibits only non‐consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms.

In this installment of “To Cap or Not to Cap,” which was previously featured on Weil’s Bankruptcy Blog in May of 2015 (see here), we reviewed a recent decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In Kupfer v.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s ruling that a mortgagee did not violate the discharge injunction in 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) by sending IRS 1099-A forms to borrowers after their discharge, agreeing that the IRS forms were not objectively coercive attempts to collect a debt.

A copy of the opinion in Bates v. CitiMortgage, Inc. is available at: Link to Opinion.

Ruden McClosky, P.A. (“Ruden”), a formerly large and prestigious law firm that was founded in 1959 and at its peak had more than 200 attorneys commenced a bankruptcy case by filing a petition for Chapter 11 relief (“Petition”) in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida on November 1, 2011. The firm was a victim of the changing economy and the Great Recession. Ruden’s practiced largely in areas serving financial institutions and real estate developers—areas particularly hard hit by the recession.

(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 6, 2017)

In a win for secured creditors, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that a debtor who sought to cure a pre-petition default of its loan through its Chapter 11 plan must pay the default rate of interest set forth in the note. In Pacifica L 51 LLC v. New Investments Inc., the debtor proposed to pay the outstanding amount due under the note at the pre-default interest rate.