January 19, 2017
Second Circuit Overturns Marblegate, Rejecting Expansive Interpretation of Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act
In Split Decision, Appeals Court Rules That Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 Prohibits Only Formal Non-Consensual Amendments to a Qualified Indenture's Core Payment Terms
SUMMARY
On November 17, 2016, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Delaware Trust Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co. LLC, No. 16-1351 (3d Cir. Nov. 17, 2016) clarified the often-muddy interplay between indenture acceleration provisions and "make-whole" redemption provisions, holding that Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co. LLC and EFIH Finance Inc. (collectively, "EFIH") were unable to avoid paying lenders approximately $800 million in expected interest by voluntarily filing for bankruptcy.
The Second Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp., holding that “Section 316(b) prohibits only non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms.” At issue is whether the phrase “right . . . to receive payment” forecloses “more than formal amendments to payment terms that eliminate the right to sue for payment.” The Second Circuit held that it does not.
In its highly anticipated Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp. decision,[1] the U.S.
Imagine that while a bankruptcy case is pending, the debtor-in-possession or bankruptcy trustee files a state law claim against one of the estate's creditors. Presumably, if the debtor wins its state law claim, that recovery augments the bankruptcy estate and increases the amount available to pay the debtor's creditors.[1] The creditor, seeking to avoid litigating the action in the debtor's home state court, timely removes the lawsuit to federal court as permitted under 28 U.S.C.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) for the First Circuit recently upheld a licensee’s rights to use a debtor’s trademarks and logo after a rejection by the debtor of the underlying licensing and distribution agreement. Mission Product Holdings, Inc., v. Tempnology LLC (In re Tempnology LLC) 2016 WL 6832837 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 11/18/16).
Trust Indenture Act Section 316(b) Limited to Actual Amendments to An Indenture’s Core Terms
Two recent opinions concerning the law of substantive consolidation should be of interest to business owners and commercial real estate market participants. The doctrine of substantive consolidation allows a bankruptcy court, in certain circumstances, to augment the assets of a debtor’s bankruptcy estate with the assets of others affiliated with the debtor. The two decisions both involved efforts by chapter 7 trustees to substantively consolidate the assets of related, non-debtor entities with the bankruptcy estate administered by each trustee.
The influential Delaware bankruptcy court issued a recent decision that all secured lenders need to be aware of. In this decision, the bankruptcy court held that the fees of the official creditors’ committee were not limited by the dollar-amount cap in the financing order because the debtors confirmed their chapter 11 plan. The creditors’ committee argued that it was entitled to over $8 million in fees while the secured lender asserted that the committee’s fees were capped at $250,000 due to what the bankruptcy court referred to as a “standard carve-out provision” in the financing order.
This week the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its highly-anticipated ruling in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Corp. (“Marblegate”). At issue in Marblegate was whether Education Management Corp. (“EDMC”) violated the Trust Indenture Act when it implemented a restructuring that impaired the rights of Marblegate Asset Management, LLC (“MAM”). The Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision in favor of MAM, and held that EDMC’s restructuring did not violate the TIA.