In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Halifax Fund, L.P. (In re Applied Theory Corp.),1 the Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that an official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee"), under the circumstances, did not have the right to commence an adversary proceeding seeking the equitable subordination of claims held by insiders of a Chapter 11 debtor. The Applied Theory court rebuffed the Committee's characterization of its claim as a direct claim that the Committee could prosecute without the bankruptcy court's permission.

In re Adelphia Communications Corp.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held that neither a creditor’s aggressive litigation tactics resulting in the creditor’s prospective receipt under a proposed plan of special consideration for voting in favor of the plan, which special consideration other members of the same class that voted against the plan would not obtain, nor the creditor’s ownership of claims in several debtors, in a multi-debtor Chapter 11 case, was a sufficient basis for the “draconian sanction” of disallowing such creditor’s votes

In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Whalen (In re Enron Corp.), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York considered whether the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy payment of an employment bonus one day before it became due was “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made” for purposes of determining whether section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code made the payment avoidable as a preferential transfer.

In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit held that the most important factor for a bankruptcy court to consider in approving a pre-plan settlement pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 is whether the settlement’s distribution scheme complies with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. Prior to this ruling, courts in the Second Circuit generally considered the following factors when approving settlement agreements:

On August 30, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved the Disclosure Statement for the Revised Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. and its affiliated debtors (collectively, the "Debtors"). The Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Disclosure Statement will permit the Debtors to begin soliciting votes to accept the Plan and is a significant step forward in the Debtors' efforts to achieve resolution of the nation's largest-ever bankruptcy.

Several recent cases in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York have created ambiguity about when distressed exchange offers violate Section 316(b) of the 1939 Trust Indenture Act (the “TIA”). It appears that plaintiffs’ lawyers are using this ambiguity to challenge distressed exchange offers. The threat of litigation may give minority bondholders a powerful tool to hinder less than fully consensual out-of-court restructurings and provide them with increased leverage in negotiations.

The Third Circuit recently affirmed that a debtor in Chapter 11 can use a tender offer to settle claims without running afoul of the Bankruptcy Code. Although In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.is limited to its particular facts and circumstances, the decision could lead to increased use of tender offers prior to confirmation of a bankruptcy plan.

Borrowers, agent banks, syndicate members and secondary market purchasers incur, syndicate, sell and buy bank debt on the assumption that bank debt is not a “security.” However, a June 30, 2016, opinion in the General Motors preference litigation¹shows that such an assumption may no longer be valid, at least under the Bankruptcy Code.

In a pair of decisions in 2015, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the District of Delaware determined that neither the first lien notes trustee nor the second lien notes trustee of Energy Future Intermediate Holdings Corp. (“EFIH”), a subsidiary of Energy Future Holdings (“EFH”), was entitled to receive a make-whole on the repayment of the corresponding indebtedness resulting from the acceleration of that debt in the EFH bankruptcy case.

Market participants involved in distressed exchange offers have become accustomed to grappling with the implications of Trust Indenture Act Section 316(b) in the context of potential exit consents, i.e., are the contemplated amendments to the indenture governing the securities subject to the exchange significant enough to impair or affect the right of a holder to receive payment of principal and interest on or after the due dates of the relevant note?