Sometimes the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code leads to unexpected results. In a recent case, the US Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit (BAP) has ruled that section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code requires the subordination of certain claims against a debtor to all equity interests in the debtor, even though such subordination may mean that the holders of the claims will receive nothing on the claims.

This article was published in slightly different format in the January 2008 issue of Credit Magazine.

In National Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc. v. Liberty Electric Power, LLC (In re National Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc.),1 the Fourth Circuit held that, where an unsecured creditor receives payment from a non-debtor guarantor in partial satisfaction of a claim against the debtor, for purposes of the creditor's claim against the debtor, the creditor may not choose to allocate such payment to post-petition interest.

In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Halifax Fund, L.P. (In re Applied Theory Corp.),1 the Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that an official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee"), under the circumstances, did not have the right to commence an adversary proceeding seeking the equitable subordination of claims held by insiders of a Chapter 11 debtor. The Applied Theory court rebuffed the Committee's characterization of its claim as a direct claim that the Committee could prosecute without the bankruptcy court's permission.

In re Adelphia Communications Corp.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held that neither a creditor’s aggressive litigation tactics resulting in the creditor’s prospective receipt under a proposed plan of special consideration for voting in favor of the plan, which special consideration other members of the same class that voted against the plan would not obtain, nor the creditor’s ownership of claims in several debtors, in a multi-debtor Chapter 11 case, was a sufficient basis for the “draconian sanction” of disallowing such creditor’s votes

In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Whalen (In re Enron Corp.), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York considered whether the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy payment of an employment bonus one day before it became due was “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made” for purposes of determining whether section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code made the payment avoidable as a preferential transfer.

In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit held that the most important factor for a bankruptcy court to consider in approving a pre-plan settlement pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 is whether the settlement’s distribution scheme complies with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. Prior to this ruling, courts in the Second Circuit generally considered the following factors when approving settlement agreements:

This issue considers the most important provisions of the resolution adopted at the Plenary Session of the Supreme Commercial Court of the Russian Federation (the “SCC”) No. 88, dated 6 December 2013, “On Accrual and Payment of Interest on Creditors’ Claims in Insolvency” (the “Resolution”)1. The Resolution resolves a number of important practical issues and creates new regulations governing, in particular:

Not necessarily so, according to the recent rulings of Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper in the US$27 billion General Growth Properties Chapter 11 bankruptcy—at least with respect to the issue of substantive consolidation.

On September 15, 2009, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York ordered Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to make payments to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) under a prepetition interest rate swap agreement guaranteed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI” and, together with LBSF, “Lehman”) after Metavante had suspended ordinary course settlement payments under the swap.1 Metavante claimed a contractual right to withhold payment under Section 2(a)(iii) of the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy.