Not necessarily so, according to the recent rulings of Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper in the US$27 billion General Growth Properties Chapter 11 bankruptcy—at least with respect to the issue of substantive consolidation.

On September 15, 2009, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York ordered Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to make payments to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) under a prepetition interest rate swap agreement guaranteed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI” and, together with LBSF, “Lehman”) after Metavante had suspended ordinary course settlement payments under the swap.1 Metavante claimed a contractual right to withhold payment under Section 2(a)(iii) of the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy.

Debt-for-debt exchanges are not new, but are worth revisiting given the current economic climate. Furthermore, the recently enacted "Stimulus Act"1 provides some temporary relief to debtors from potentially harsh tax consequences of restructuring. The following discussion is relevant to issuers (also referred to as debtors) or holders (also referred to as creditors) of debt who are "US persons" (as defined in the US Internal Revenue Code).2

In order to illustrate some of the key US federal income tax consequences of a debt-for-debt exchange, consider the following example:

Due to the ongoing financial crisis and the economic downturn accompanied therewith, many German companies are or will be struggling with default and insolvency problems.

When a creditor seeks equitable relief in a bankruptcy court, must the court always follow common law principles of equity? Not according to several courts, including the Second Circuit. Concluding that the granting of equitable remedies may circumvent the Bankruptcy Code's equitable distribution system, courts have limited the application of equitable remedies in the bankruptcy context.

In the wake of recent bankruptcy filings by several prominent financial institutions, there’s a growing interest in changing standard credit documentation to address the risks of defaulting lenders and nonperforming administrative agents. Here are credit agreement provisions that financial institutions, acting as swingline lenders and letter of credit issuers, can require to protect themselves against the risk of a defaulting lender.

The European High Yield Association (EHYA), which represents banks and investors involved in high risk bond and loan markets, has written to the UK Treasury suggesting three key areas to reform insolvency legislation to improve the 'efficiency and fairness' of corporate restructurings.

The letter suggests changes to help prevent value destruction caused by suppliers and customers terminating contractual relations, speed up resolution of disputes and restrict the influence of creditors and shareholders with no economic interest in the revalued business.

Sometimes the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code leads to unexpected results. In a recent case, the US Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit (BAP) has ruled that section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code requires the subordination of certain claims against a debtor to all equity interests in the debtor, even though such subordination may mean that the holders of the claims will receive nothing on the claims.

This article was published in slightly different format in the January 2008 issue of Credit Magazine.

In National Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc. v. Liberty Electric Power, LLC (In re National Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc.),1 the Fourth Circuit held that, where an unsecured creditor receives payment from a non-debtor guarantor in partial satisfaction of a claim against the debtor, for purposes of the creditor's claim against the debtor, the creditor may not choose to allocate such payment to post-petition interest.