In re Adelphia Communications Corp.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held that neither a creditor’s aggressive litigation tactics resulting in the creditor’s prospective receipt under a proposed plan of special consideration for voting in favor of the plan, which special consideration other members of the same class that voted against the plan would not obtain, nor the creditor’s ownership of claims in several debtors, in a multi-debtor Chapter 11 case, was a sufficient basis for the “draconian sanction” of disallowing such creditor’s votes

In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Whalen (In re Enron Corp.), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York considered whether the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy payment of an employment bonus one day before it became due was “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made” for purposes of determining whether section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code made the payment avoidable as a preferential transfer.

In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit held that the most important factor for a bankruptcy court to consider in approving a pre-plan settlement pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 is whether the settlement’s distribution scheme complies with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. Prior to this ruling, courts in the Second Circuit generally considered the following factors when approving settlement agreements:

This issue considers the most important provisions of the resolution adopted at the Plenary Session of the Supreme Commercial Court of the Russian Federation (the “SCC”) No. 88, dated 6 December 2013, “On Accrual and Payment of Interest on Creditors’ Claims in Insolvency” (the “Resolution”)1. The Resolution resolves a number of important practical issues and creates new regulations governing, in particular:

Not necessarily so, according to the recent rulings of Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper in the US$27 billion General Growth Properties Chapter 11 bankruptcy—at least with respect to the issue of substantive consolidation.

On September 15, 2009, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York ordered Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to make payments to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) under a prepetition interest rate swap agreement guaranteed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI” and, together with LBSF, “Lehman”) after Metavante had suspended ordinary course settlement payments under the swap.1 Metavante claimed a contractual right to withhold payment under Section 2(a)(iii) of the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy.

Debt-for-debt exchanges are not new, but are worth revisiting given the current economic climate. Furthermore, the recently enacted "Stimulus Act"1 provides some temporary relief to debtors from potentially harsh tax consequences of restructuring. The following discussion is relevant to issuers (also referred to as debtors) or holders (also referred to as creditors) of debt who are "US persons" (as defined in the US Internal Revenue Code).2

In order to illustrate some of the key US federal income tax consequences of a debt-for-debt exchange, consider the following example:

Due to the ongoing financial crisis and the economic downturn accompanied therewith, many German companies are or will be struggling with default and insolvency problems.

When a creditor seeks equitable relief in a bankruptcy court, must the court always follow common law principles of equity? Not according to several courts, including the Second Circuit. Concluding that the granting of equitable remedies may circumvent the Bankruptcy Code's equitable distribution system, courts have limited the application of equitable remedies in the bankruptcy context.

In the wake of recent bankruptcy filings by several prominent financial institutions, there’s a growing interest in changing standard credit documentation to address the risks of defaulting lenders and nonperforming administrative agents. Here are credit agreement provisions that financial institutions, acting as swingline lenders and letter of credit issuers, can require to protect themselves against the risk of a defaulting lender.