For more than a century, courts in England and Wales have refused to recognize or enforce foreign court judgments or proceedings that discharge or compromise debts governed by English law. In accordance with a rule (the "Gibbs Rule") stated in an 1890 decision by the English Court of Appeal, creditors holding debt governed by English law may still sue to recover the full amount of their debts in England even if such debts have been discharged or modified in connection with a non-U.K.

In Short

The Situation: Section 553C of the Corporations Act 2001 (WA) ("Act")provides that if a creditor and a company in liquidation have mutual dealings, the creditor must offset any sum the creditor owes to the company in liquidation against debt owed by the company.

The Question: Does the existence of a third party security interest over circulating assets (floating charge) which are intended to be set off against other debts prevent the dealings from being "mutual"?

On February 27, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a highly anticipated ruling resolving a long-standing circuit split over the scope of the Bankruptcy Code’s "safe harbor" provision exempting certain securities transaction payments from avoidance as fraudulent transfers. In Merit Management Group LP v. FTI Consulting Inc., 2018 BL 65569, No. 16-784 (U.S. Feb.

In Short

The Situation: In In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., secured noteholders argued that replacement notes distributed to them under a cram-down chapter 11 plan should bear market-rate interest rather than the lower formula rate proposed in the plan and that they were entitled to a make-whole premium.

In Feltman v. Noor Staffing Grp., LLC (In re Corp. Res. Servs. Inc.), 564 B.R. 196 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017), the bankruptcy court considered whether section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code creates a right of setoff when no such right is available under applicable nonbankruptcy law. The court concluded that section 553 does not create an independent federal right of setoff, but merely preserves any such right that exists under applicable nonbankruptcy law.

In an opinion that mostly flew under the radar in 2021, Judge Christopher Sontchi from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Court”) found a private equity sponsor (the “Sponsor”)¹ liable (and, in some cases, not liable) under various contractual and tort theories in connection with actions the Sponsor took or did not take in its failed efforts to stave off a potential bankruptcy filing of its portfolio company, Allied Systems Holdings, Inc., now known as ASHINC Corporation (“Allied” or the “Company

Mr Justice Snowden’s recent judgment sanctioning the Virgin Active restructuring plans is significant for several reasons. Not only is it the first judgment to consider the cram down power of the 2006 Companies Act, but it is only the third instance that the cross-class cram down mechanism has been used. It is also the first time it has been used to cram down classes of dissenting landlords.

In a recent decision, Twiford Enters. v. Rolling Hills Bank & Trust (In re Twiford Enters.), 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 2964, 2020 WL 6075691 (10th Cir. BAP 2020), the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the lower court’s decision awarding postpetition interest pursuant to section 506(b). The disputed issue was whether a reference in the variable rate promissory notes to an internal rate index maintained by the bank was sufficiently clear and specific to support a claim for postpetition interest. The court held that it was.

In these difficult economic times, companies seeking additional liquidity may turn to alternative sources of financing. Companies with assets that can be monetized (e.g., accounts receivable, intellectual property, real estate, equipment, etc.) may discover a number of options available to them. In particular, accounts receivable financing may be an attractive way for certain companies to obtain working capital relatively quickly.

The below is a quick snapshot of three recent tax-related developments in the insolvency and restructuring sphere.

Farnborough – appointment of a receiver and tax grouping