In December 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held as a matter of first impression in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013), that section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires a debtor “under this title” to have a domicile, a place of business, or property in the U.S., applies in cases under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.
During the last few years, the section of Royal Decree No. 267 of March 16, 1942 (the "Italian Bankruptcy Law") dedicated to pre-insolvency proceedings has been reformed extensively by the Italian legislature. The purpose of the reform is to provide distressed Italian entities with a more modern and flexible insolvency law system based on private rather than judicial initiative.
On May 4, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its first 2015 ruling in a case involving an issue of bankruptcy law. In Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, No. 14-116, 2015 BL 129010, ___ S. Ct. ___ (May 4, 2015), the court reviewed a ruling by the First Circuit Court of Appeals that an order of a bankruptcy appellate panel affirming a bankruptcy court’s denial of confirmation of a chapter 13 plan is not a final order and therefore is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), so long as the debtor remains free to propose an amended plan. See Bullard v. Hyde Park Sav.
BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING REVIEW VOL. 21 • NO. 4 JULY–AUGUST 2022 1 IN THIS ISSUE 1 U.S.
Although the automatic stay contained in section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code theoretically extends worldwide, enforcing it against international creditors, particularly sovereigns, can present practical problems in its application. The chapter 11 cases of Kumtor Gold Company CJSC and Kumtor Operating Company CJSC (collectively, "Kumtor") pending before Judge Lisa Beckerman in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Case No. 21-11051) have been testing the practical application of the automatic stay's global reach since the commencement of the cases in late May 2021.
In In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C., 2021 WL 1603608 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2021), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York addressed the interaction between purported setoff rights arising under investment agreements governed by Islamic law and the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbors protecting the exercise of non-debtors' rights under financial contracts.
One year ago, we wrote that the large business bankruptcy landscape in 2019 was generally shaped by economic, market, and leverage factors, with notable exceptions for disastrous wildfires, liabilities arising from the opioid crisis, price-fixing fallout, and corporate restructuring shenanigans.
The year 2020 was a different story altogether. The headline was COVID-19.
The practice of conferring "derivative standing" on official creditors' committees to assert claims on behalf of a bankruptcy estate in cases where the debtor or a bankruptcy trustee is unwilling or unable to do so is a well-established means of generating value for the estate from litigation recoveries. However, in a series of recent decisions, the Delaware bankruptcy courts have limited the practice in cases where applicable non-bankruptcy state law provides that creditors do not have standing to bring claims on behalf of certain entities.
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to use "cash collateral" during the course of a bankruptcy case may be vital to the debtor's prospects for a successful reorganization. However, because of the unique nature of cash collateral, the Bankruptcy Code sets forth special rules that apply to the nonconsensual use of such collateral to protect the interests of the secured creditor involved. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Washington examined these requirements in In re Claar Cellars, LLC, 2020 WL 1238924 (Bankr. E.D.
In In re Ditech Holding Corp., 2019 WL 4073378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2019), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York addressed several objections to confirmation of a chapter 11 plan that proposed to sell home mortgage loans "free and clear" of certain claims and defenses of the homeowner creditors, contrary to a provision of the Bankruptcy Code—section 363(o)—which was enacted in 2005 to prevent free and clear sales of certain claims and defenses relating to consumer credit agreements.